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SOLOMON AND STRIKES: LABOR ACTIVITY, THE
CONTRACT DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OR
IMPRACTICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE, AND
FEDERAL LABOR POLICY
Daniel P. O'Gorman*
Arthur Linton Corbin famously remarked that courts, when
deciding contract cases involving the defense of impossibility or
impracticability of performance,' should "pray for the wisdom of
Solomon."2 This is particularly true when the event causing nonperformance is labor activity. For example, Samuel Williston observed
that courts have not been entirely consistent on whether such activity
And although the First Restatement of
excuses non-performance.
Contracts included an illustration providing that a manufacturer's breach
was not excused because of a strike at its factory,4 the Second
Restatement of Contracts omitted the illustration. E. Allan Farnsworth,
the Restatement Reporter for the chapter on impracticability and
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thank the participants at the Fifth Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor &
Employment Law held in 2010 at Washington University School of Law and St. Louis University
School of Law for their useful comments. In particular, I would like to thank Professors Steven L.
Willbom, Charles A. Sullivan, Ruben J. Garcia, Matthew T. Bodie, and Marley Weiss. I would also
like to thank my Research Assistant, Sara Gross.
1. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 112, at 728 (4th ed. 2001)
("[T]he modem doctrine of impossibility of performance is often referred to as the doctrine of
impracticability.").
2. 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1333, at 372 (1962). Professor
John D. Wladis stated that such cases "can be exquisitely difficult to decide." John D. Wladis,
Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of
Performance in English ContractLaw, 75 GEo. L.J. 1575, 1575 (1987).
3.

6 SAMUEL

CONTRACTS

§ 195 1A,

WILLISTON & GEORGE J. TIIOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

at 5466 & n.8 (rev. ed. 1938); see also 30 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD

A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 77:92,

at 577 (4th ed. 2004) ("Whether a

strike affecting the means of performance constitutes impracticability is not readily answered by
case law.").
4.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS

§ 461

5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

illus. 7 (1932).

§ 261

reporter's note, cmt. d (1981).

47
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frustration of performance, explained that the illustration had been
omitted "because the parties often provide for this eventuality and,
where they do not, it is particularly difficult to suggest a proper result
without a detailed statement of all the circumstances."
This article addresses whether such cases are not only difficult
because they depend on each case's particular circumstances, but
because whether to excuse a party's non-performance due to labor
activity often involves issues of federal labor policy. 7 This intersection
of contract doctrine and federal labor policy is an area that has been
neglected by both contract scholars and labor law scholars. When
considering the contract doctrine of impracticability, contract scholars
devote little attention to whether such cases affect areas of concern
outside of contract law. When considering federal labor policy, labor law
scholars generally only consider unions' and employers' rights and
duties under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act"),8 as
amended, and fail to take into account that the common-law contract
rights of employers and third parties can play an important role in
federal labor policy. Although the issue of labor activity excusing the
non-performance of a contract duty might currently arise less often than
in the past because of the decrease in union density, the increasing
receptiveness of courts over the twentieth century to the excuse of
impracticability, coupled with Congress's decision to remove authority
of the federal courts and states over labor matters, invites a clash
between state contract law and federal policy.
The first part of this article addresses the contract doctrine of
impossibility or impracticability of performance. The second part
addresses unions' and employers' rights and duties under federal labor
law and, in particular, those rights and duties that could be affected by
the contract doctrine of impossibility or impracticability of performance.
The third part reviews a sample of representative cases involving labor
activity and the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability of
The fourth part addresses how the doctrine of
performance.
impossibility or impracticability should be applied in cases involving
labor activity, and concludes that courts should generally not consider
federal labor policy because Congress intended such policy to be made
by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). 9 The fourth part also
6. Id.
7. See WILLIsTON & LORD, supra note 3, § 77:92, at 577 (noting that determining whether a
labor dispute constitutes impracticability often involves matters of federal and state labor laws).

8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
9. This article does not address the related doctrine of frustration of purpose. This doctrine
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concludes, however, that courts should not hesitate to scrutinize a party's
alleged excuse for non-performance simply because federal labor law
issues are involved.
I. THE CONTRACT DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OR
IMPRACTICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE
When two or more parties have entered into a contract, a party's
non-performance of a contract duty when it is due is a breach,10 and the
injured party is provided with a right to damages." Unlike a party's duty
in tort to not act negligently, a party's liability under contract law is
absolute or strict liability.12 Thus, a party is liable for non-performance
of a contract duty even if the party was not negligent.' 3 In some
situations, however, a party's duty to perform will never become due,
and thus non-performance will not be considered a breach. An example
is when the party's performance is rendered impossible or impracticable
by an event occurring after the contract's formation.14

could possibly be a defense to non-performance as a result of labor activity. For example, if a hotel
and an organization entered into a contract for the hotel to host an event of the organization, and a
union boycotted the hotel, the doctrine of frustration of purpose might excuse the organization's
non-performance if a substantial number of expected guests for the event refused to attend.
10.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 235(2).

11. Id. § 346(1).
12. See id. ch. 11, introductory note ("Contract liability is strict liability.").
13. See id. § 235 cmt. b ("When performance is due . . . anything short of full performance is
a breach, even if the party who does not fully perform was not at fault . . . ."); id. ch. 11,
introductory note ("It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to be kept. The
obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach of contract even if he is without fault and even if
circumstances have made the contract more burdensome or less desirable than he anticipated."); see,
e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929) (defendant doctor held liable for breach of a
promise as to the result of an operation even though the doctor was not negligent).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 ("Where, after a contract is made, a
party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary."). The
doctrine of impossibility or impracticability of performance also applies to situations in which
performance is impossible or impracticable at the time the contract is entered into. See id § 266(1)
("Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's performance under it is impracticable without his
fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-existence of which is a basic
assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render that performance arises, unless the
language or circumstances indicate the contrary."). This article, however, will focus on so-called
"supervening impracticability."
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A. Impossibility at English Common Law
At early English common law, the circumstances under which a
promisor's duty to perform would be excused because of unforeseen
circumstances were few.15 In general, a party was held to its contract
obligations irrespective of any supervening event.16 Although specific
performance would often not be an option (for obvious reasons), the
promisor would still be liable for damages.' 7 If a party wanted to be
excused from performing because of a supervening event, the party was
expected to draft a contract provision providing for such an excuse. 8
This "harsh traditional common law rule"' 9 is exemplified by
Paradinev. Jane,20 decided by the Court of King's Bench in 1647.21 In
Paradine,a lessee was held obligated to pay promised rent to the lessor
under a contract even though the lessee had been expelled from the land
because of an invading force, and even though the lessee would
presumably pay rent from the proceeds from working the land.22 The
court stated that
when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon
himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any
accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided
against it by his contract. And therefore if the lessee covenant to repair
a house, though it be burnt by lightning, or thrown down by enemies,

15. Equity courts, at least for a time, were apparently more likely to recognize unforeseen
circumstances as an excuse for non-performance. See Wladis, supranote 2, at 1585-86 (noting that
equity courts were more likely to recognize unforeseen circumstances as an excuse, at least until the
early nineteenth century).
16. See Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363, 366 (Mass.
1974) ("[A] strict rule was originally followed denying any excuse for accident or 'inevitable
necessity' . . . ." (quoting Adams v. Nichols, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 275, 276 (1837))); JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 13.1, at 445 (6th ed. 2009) ("The harsh
traditional common law rule was 'pacta sunt servanda;' promises must be kept though the heavens
fall.").
17. PERILLO, supra note 16, § 13.1, at 445-46.
18. Id. at 446.
19. Id. at 445.
20. (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.); Aleyn 26.
21. See MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726 ("It is generally said that the early law of
England, which was inclined to enforce a contract in accordance with its literal terms in all cases,
took the uncompromising stand that neither impossibility, nor any change of circumstances,
however extreme, would excuse performance of a promise. This view is set forth in the case of
Paradinev. Jane....").
22. See Paradine,82 Eng. Rep. at 897-98; Aleyn at 26, 27.
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yet he ought to repair it.2 3
Although some have construed Paradineas establishing a rule that

performance is not excused even if performance becomes impossible,
the case likely stood for the proposition that performance must be
impossible, not merely onerous.24 This is supported by the court's
statement that the promisor is obligated to perform "if he may." 25 Also,
the lessee's promised performance in Paradine-thepayment of rentwas not impossible.26 In fact, "[e]ven the defendant did not plead that it
was impossible for him to pay, only that it was unreasonable to require
him to pay when he had not received the use of the lands leased." 27
Additionally, the authorities cited in Paradine involved situations in
which performance was "onerous," but not impossible.2 8
This reading of Paradine is further supported by the fact that
English common law at the time had already recognized impossibility
(as opposed to impracticability) as an excuse for non-performance in
certain circumstances. 29 These circumstances included: (1) contracts for

23. Id.
24. See Wladis, supra note 2, at 1585 ("[O]n balance, it seems the Paradine court intended
the contract portion of its rule to apply only if performance had not been made impossible.").
25. See id. at 1583 ("The court most likely meant that when a party creates a contractual duty
in himself, he is bound to perform if performance is still possible-'ifhe may."' (quoting Paradine,
82 Eng. Rep. at 898; Aleyn at 27)).
26. See MURRAY, supranote 1, § 112, at 726 nI. As Dean Murray has observed, the lessee's
performance in Paradine-the payment of rent-was in fact not rendered impossible or
impracticable by the invading force. See id. ("It should be noted that the promisor's performance,
i.e., paying the rent, was not made impossible at all by the supervening event."). But see A.W.B.
SIMPsON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF

ASSUMPSIT 531 (1975) ("The argument on the other side for contending that the payment of rent is
impossible is that rent issues out of the land, and when the lessee is not in occupation he cannot
collect the profits from which the rent must come .... .").
27. Wladis, supra note 2, at 1584. Dean Murray believes the case is more appropriately
classified as one in which the lessee was seeking to be excused from performing under what is now
called the doctrine of "frustration of purpose." See MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726 n.1 ("If he
were to be excused from performing, the only basis for such excuse would be frustration of
purpose."); see, e.g., Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (A.C.) at 740-41, 754 (Eng.) (holding that
the defendant was excused from paying a promised fee for the use of an apartment to watch a
coronation procession when the procession was canceled after the parties entered into the contract).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981) ("Where, after a contract is
made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his
remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances
indicate to the contrary.").

28. See Wladis, supranote 2, at 1583.
29. See MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726 ("Even the old English courts at the time of
[Paradinev. Jane] recognized obvious exceptions to the rigid rule.").
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personal services where the promisor died or was ill; 30 (2) contracts
where performance was rendered unlawful by a supervening change in
the law;31 and (3) contracts where the existence of a thing necessary for
performance is destroyed (e.g., promised goods) without the promisor's
fault. 32
A.W.B. Simpson has suggested that these exceptions were in fact
but applications of a general theory that impossibility of performance
(except when caused by the act of a stranger) was an excuse for nonperformance. 3 Because initial impossibility (impossibility of
performance at the time of contracting) rendered the contract void,
"supervening impossibility [as opposed to performance simply being
more onerous] as a defence follow[ed] a fortiori."34 Others, however,
have suggested that these were the only three situations in which
performance would be excused, and the exceptions were probably
limited to these three out of "an understandable fear to suggest any
general principle of excusable nonperformance where these exceptions
could be recognized as illustrations."3 s Williston stated, for example,
30. PERILLO, supra note 16, § 13.1, at 446; see MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726; see also
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 620-21 (4th ed. 2004). This exception is traced to Hyde v.
Dean of Windsor, (1597) 78 Eng. Rep. 798 (K.B.); Croke, Eliz. 552. See MURRAY, supra note 1, §
112, at 726 n.2.
31. PERILLO, supra note 16, § 13.1, at 446; see MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, at 620. This exception is traced to Abbot of Westminster v. Clerke,
(1536) 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (K.B.); I Dyer 26b. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, at 620 & n.2; see
also MURRAY, supranote 1, § 112, at 726 n.3.
32. FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, at 621; see MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726. This
exception can be traced to Williams v. Lloyd, (1629) 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B); W. Jones 179. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 30, at 621 & n.12; MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726 n.4. Williston
apparently felt the decision in Williams was limited to live animals, and that it was not until Taylor
v. Caldwell, discussed infra note 45, that this exception firmly took root. See 3 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1931, at 3281 (1924) ("So modem are the exceptions to the
general principle, that it was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century that it was held that
the destruction or non-existence of inanimate subject-matter to which a contract related would
excuse a promisor from liability." (citations omitted)). In fact, "[t]here were at least two assumpsit
cases holding that if performance became impossible by an act of God there was no excuse [and
b]oth concemed carriers who lost cargo is tempests." Wladis, supra note 2, at 1585 n.53 (citing
Taylor's Case, (1583) 74 Eng. Rep. 708 (K.B.); 4 Leon. 31); Thompson v. Miles, summarized in H.
ROLLE, UN ABRIDGEMENT DES PLUSIEURS CASES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL COMMON LEY Condition §
G, pl. 9, at 450 (1668)).
33. See SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 30.
34. Id. Professor Simpson acknowledges, however, that "[t]here is no direct authority [for
this theory] except on the effect of the death of the covenantor, a clear case of act of God." Id. at
3 1. The rationale for considering void a promise to do something that, at the time the promise was
made, was impossible was presumably that "it was thought to be absurd that the law should
recognize an impossible promise." Id at 525.
35. MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 726. These three traditional exceptions are still
recognized, and each has its own section in the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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that "as to other cases of impossibility, it was thought enough to say that
if the promisor wished to protect himself he might have done so by
,,36
Professor John D. Wiadis,
proper conditions or qualifications.
however, has asserted that the law before Paradinewas in "a state of
flux," and thus no clear rules for the time period can be provided.
Importantly, two types of cases would not excuse non-performance
under early English common law. First, non-performance would not be
excused if performance was simply rendered more onerous, as opposed
to being rendered impossible.3 8 For example, in the hypothetical
provided in Paradine, a lessee who promises to repair a house is not
excused from performing because it bums down from a lightning
strike.39 It might now be more onerous to repair the house, but it is not
impossible. Second, Professor Simpson has concluded that even when
performance was rendered impossible (as opposed to simply more
onerous), if the impossibility was caused by the act of a stranger, the
promisor's non-performance would not be excused. 4 0 Thus, in a case
such as Paradine, non-performance would not be excused because
performance (the payment of rent) was not impossible and also because
the impossibility was caused by a stranger's act.4 1
But for whatever reason, during the first half of the nineteenth
century, a "[s]trict interpretation of the Paradineprinciple" prevailed.42
During this time, a series of cases adopted a rule that "the obligor is
OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1981) (titled "Death or Incapacity of Person Necessary for Performance");
id § 263 (titled "Destruction, Deterioration or Failure to Come into Existence of Thing Necessary
for Performance"); id. § 264 (titled "Prevention by Governmental Regulation or Order"). But the
Restatement Comment makes it clear that unlike the old English common-law rule, the modern
doctrine of impracticability is not limited to these three circumstances. See id § 261 cmt. a ("This
Section states the general principle under which a party's duty may be so discharged. The following
three sections deal with the three categories of cases where this general principle has traditionally
been applied . . .

[b]ut . . . this Section states a principle broadly applicable to all types of

impracticability and it 'deliberately refrains from any effort at an exhaustive expression of
contingencies." (quoting U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt.2 (2010))).
36. WILLIsTON, supra note 32, § 1931, at 3280.
37. Wladis, supra note 2, at 1629-30.
38. SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 30. Professor Simpson asserts that this principle was
established in Paradine.See id. at 33.
39. See Paradine v. Jane, (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.) 898; Aleyn 26, 27 ("And therefore
if the lessee covenant to repair a house, though it be bumt by lightning, or thrown down by enemies,
yet he ought to repair it.").
40. SIMPSON, supra note 26, at 30. Simpson discusses a 1455 case in which the defendant's
failure to marry the plaintiffs daughter was not excused even though the daughter refused to marry
him. Id. (citation omitted).
41. See id at 532 ("For Paradinev. Jane is not dealing with an act of God at all, nor does it
seek to impose liability for failure to do what is wholly impossible.").
42. Wladis, supra note 2, at 1588-89.
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excused from performing only if the contract so provides, even if his
Thus, a limited rule of
performance becomes impossible."4 3
impossibility as illustrated by Paradinein the mid-seventeenth century
was made even more limited during the first half of the nineteenth
century.
B. Modern Law ofImpossibility or ImpracticabilityofPerformance
But then came the famous decision of the Court of King's Bench in
1863-Taylor v. Caldwell," the case that is generally considered the
first case in the modem era of the impossibility doctrine.45 In Taylor, the
parties entered into a contract under which the defendants promised to
provide the plaintiffs with the use of the Surrey Gardens and Music Hall
on four specified days for concerts and f6tes, and in exchange the
plaintiffs promised to pay the defendants £100 for each day.46 Before
the first specified day, through no fault of either party, the Music Hall
burned down, and the plaintiffs sued the defendants for breach of
contract.4 8 The contract did not address such a contingency, and the
court was required to decide whether the Music Hall's destruction
excused the defendants' non-performance. 4 9 The court held that despite
the general rule that even impossibility of performance was not an
excuse (the strict version of Paradine),so when the parties must have
assumed the continued existence of a specified thing as necessary to
performance, it would be implied that the parties' duty to perform was
conditional upon such continued existence.5
Building on the Taylor decision, by the beginning of the twentieth
century, excuse was recognized (or again recognized, depending on
one's view of the state of the law at the time of Paradine) in the
following situations: "(1) Unavailability of a specific person or thing
necessary for performance; (2) supervening domestic illegality or other
governmental interference; (3) contractual excuse clause; (4) fault of a

43. Id. at 1592.
44. (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B); 3 B. & S. 826.
45. PERILLO, supra note 16, § 13.1, at 446; see also MURRAY, supra note 1, § 112, at 727
("The modem doctrine of impossibility of performance emerged from the case of Taylor v. Caldwell
in 1863." (citation omitted)).
46. Taylor, 122 Eng. Rep. at 313; 3 B. & S. at 832.
47. Id. at 313; 3 B. & S. at 832.
48. See id; 3 B. & S. at 833.
49. Id.; 3 B. & S. at 833.
50. Id.; 3 B. & S. at 833.
51. Id. at 315-16; 3 B. & S. at 839-40.
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party; and (5) temporary delay likely to last for more than a reasonable
time."52
More controversial, however, were situations in which performance
was not rendered impossible by a supervening event, but rendered
"impracticable" because such an event made performance more
expensive or difficult than anticipated. As observed by Dean Murray,
[f]rom its inception, the concept of impracticability was treated with
extreme judicial caution and the modem judicial reaction clings to that
view. To permit a promisor to be excused from performance because
the cost of his performance has risen even to extreme levels appeared
to threaten the fundamental concept of the social institution of
contract.s5
But it was believed there might be situations in which justice suggests
that a supervening event was so unanticipated, and the resulting burden
of performance on the promisor so extreme, that it cannot be said that
the promisor assumed the risk of non-performance under the
circumstances.54
The decision in Taylor might have already invited an expansion of
the impossibility doctrine into the realm of the impracticable, if one
considers rebuilding the Music Hall to have been possible. Williston,
writing in 1920, stated that "[t]he fact that by supervening circumstances
performance of a promise is made more difficult and expensive, or the
counterperformance of less value than the parties anticipated when the
contract was made, will ordinarily not excuse the promisor."ss He then
noted, however, that "where a very great increase in expense is caused
by a circumstance not only unanticipated but inconsistent with facts
which the parties obviously assumed as likely to continue, the basic
reason for excusing the promisor from liability seems present." 56 And
Williston was able to refer to cases in which non-performance had been
excused when performance was not impossible, but only impracticable. 57
In 1932, the Restatement (First) of Contracts included provisions
regarding impossibility of performance. 8 The Restatement, as would be
expected, provided that
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Wladis, supra note 2, at 1608.
MuRRAY, supranote 1, § 112, at 728.
See id.
WILUSTON, supranote 32, § 1963, at 3334 (citations omitted).
Id. § 1963, at 3336 (citations omitted).
See id. § 1963, at 3336-37 (citations omitted).

58.

See RESTATEMENT (FtRST) OF CONTRACTS
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where, after the formation of a contract [1] facts that a promisor had no
reason to anticipate, and (2] for the occurrence of which he is not
contributing fault, [3] render performance of the promise impossible,
the duty of the promisor is discharged, [4] unless a contrary intention
has been manifested.59
But importantly, the First Restatement noted that "impossibility
means not only strict impossibility but impracticability because of
extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved,"60
though it cautioned that "[m]ere unanticipated difficulty . . . not
amounting to impracticability" is insufficient.61 The First Restatement
also made clear that non-performance would only be excused when it
was "objectively" impossible, meaning that performance would be
impracticable for anyone, as opposed to "subjectively" impossible,
meaning that performance was only impossible for the promisor.62
The First Restatement included an illustration dealing specifically
with impracticability and a labor dispute. The illustration provided as
follows:
A contracts with B to sell him on a specified day ten thousand yards of
cloth of a specified kind manufactured in A's factory. B does not
contract on the assumption that cloth previously manufactured cannot
or will not be used to fulfil the contract. A, however, has not sufficient
cloth of the kind on hand to enable him to fulfil the contract, and
shortly after its formation a strike takes place in A's factory as part of
an organized labor movement. The strike is due to conditions in other
factories, and nothing that A can do will induce his employees to
continue work. Conditions are also such that A cannot secure other
employees qualified to complete the work. A's duty is not
discharged. 63
The American Law Institute did not explain, however, why the
manufacturer's duty was not discharged because of the strike. 4
Particularly because the strike was not the manufacturer's fault and not
one over which it had control, it would seem the manufacturer's duty
would be discharged. It therefore must have been because the
59. Id. § 457.
60. Id § 454.
61. Id. § 454 cmt. a; see also id. §467 ("[F]acts existing when a bargain is made or occurring
thereafter making performance of a promise more difficult or expensive than the parties anticipate,
do not prevent a duty from arising or discharge a duty that has arisen.").
62. Id. § 455 cmt. a.
63. Id. § 461 illus. 7.
64. See id.
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manufacturer had reason to anticipate the strike. For example, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts construed the illustration as
standing for the proposition that "in general, labor disputes cannot be
considered extraordinary in the course of modem commerce."6 5 The
failure to excuse the manufacturer's non-performance might also have
been due to Williston, the First Restatement's reporter, being a "hardliner" on the issue of impossibility and impracticability of
performance.66 But by 1938, even Williston conceded that the trend was
toward strikes being recognized as an excuse for non-performance.
Article 2 of the UCC also included a provision on
impracticability.68 Section 2-615 provides that unless the seller assumed
a greater obligation,
[d]elay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is
not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as
agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made.69
The Official Comment notes that "[ilncreased cost alone does not excuse
performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen
contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance."o The
Comment provides, however, that
a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency
such as .

.

. unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the

like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether
prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his
performance, is within the contemplation of this section. 71
The question is, "[w]as the contingency which developed one which the
parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as a real possibility
which could affect performance?" 72
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also included a provision
65. Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363, 368 (Mass. 1974).
66. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
64 (1981) (referring to Williston as one of the "hard-liners" on the issue of impossibility or
impracticability of performance).
67. WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 195 1A, at 5464-68.
68. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (2010).
69. Id. § 2-615(a).
70. Id. § 2-615 cmt. 4.
71. Id.
72. Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Mass. 1974).
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on impracticability.73 Under section 261, a promisor's duty to perform is
discharged if, after entering into the contract, "[1] performance is made
impracticable [2] without his fault [3] by the occurrence of an event the
non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made . . . [4] unless the language [of the contract] or the

circumstances indicate the contrary."74
With respect to performance being impracticable, the Comment
notes that "[p]erformance may be impracticable because extreme and
unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties will
be involved."75 Similar to the UCC Comment, the Second Restatement
Comment provides that "[a] severe shortage of raw materials or of
supplies due to . . . unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply, or

the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or prevents
performance altogether may bring the case within the rule stated in this
Section." 76 The Comment notes, however, that "[a] mere change in the
degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as increased wages,
prices of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless well beyond the
normal range, does not amount to impracticability since it is this sort of
risk that a fixed-price contract is intended to cover." 77 The Comment
further provides that "a party is expected to use reasonable efforts to
surmount obstacles

to performance

. . . and a performance

is

impracticable only if it is so in spite of such efforts."7 8 Also,
if the performance remains practicable and it is merely beyond the
party's capacity to render it, he is ordinarily not discharged . . . .

Instead, the rationale is that a party generally assumes the risk of his
own inability to perform his duty. Even if a party contracts to render a
performance that depends on some act by a third party, he is not
ordinarily discharged because of a failure by that party because this is
also a risk that is commonly understood to be on the obligor. 9
With respect to "fault," the Comment states that "[a]s used here
'fault' may include not only 'willful' wrongs, but such other types of
conduct as that amounting to breach of contract or to negligence."8 0

73.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 261

(1981).

74. Id.

75. Id. cmt. d.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id. cmt. e.
80. Id. cmt. d.
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With respect to the "basic assumption" element, the Second
Restatement's Introductory Note provides that "[d]etermining whether
the non-occurrence of a particular event was or was not a basic
assumption involves a judgment as to which party assumed the risk of its
occurrence." 1 The Introductory Note provides that "[i]n making such
determinations, a court will look at all circumstances, including the
terms of the contract."82 Factors include (1) whether the event was
foreseeable; (2) "the relative bargaining positions of the parties"; (3)
"the relative ease with which either party could have included a clause";
and (4) "the effectiveness of the market in spreading such risks as, for
example, where the obligor is a middleman who has an opportunity to
adjust his prices to cover them."83 The Comment provides that "[i]n
borderline cases this criterion is sufficiently flexible to take account of
factors that bear on a just allocation of risk." 84
With respect to whether the parties indicated an intention for the
promisor's duty to not be discharged by the event, relevant
circumstances include the promisor's "ability to have inserted a
provision in the contract expressly shifting the risk of impracticability to
the other party."8 The Comment notes that "[t]his will depend on the
extent to which the agreement was standardized . .. the degree to which
the other party supplied the terms . . . and, in the case of a particular

trade or other group, the frequency with which language so allocating
the risk is used in that trade or group."86
The Second Restatement deleted the First Restatement's illustration
7, which failed to discharge a manufacturer's duty as a result of a strike
by its employees. 8 7 The Reporter's Note provides that "[i]llustration 7 to
former § 461, which dealt with the effect on a party's duties of a strike
by his employees, is omitted, because the parties often provide for this
eventuality and, where they do not, it is particularly difficult to suggest a
,,88
proper result without a detailed statement of all the circumstances.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. ch. 11, introductory note.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 261 cmt. b.
Id. cmt. c.
Id.
See id. §261 reporter's note, cmt. d.
Id.
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C. ProceduralIssues
The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of
impossibility or impracticability of performance. 89 Thus, the defendant
has the burden of proving each element of the defense. 90 Also, "[t]he
question is generally considered to be one of law rather than fact, for the
court rather than the jury."91
D. Rationalefor the DoctrineofImpossibility or
ImpracticabilityofPerformance
Generally, three rationales are provided to explain the
impracticability doctrine. First, some maintain that it is an implied-infact term. 9 2 Under this rationale, "[t]he contract is set aside ... because
the parties themselves implicitly stipulated such an outcome."9
The
Court of King's Bench took this approach in Taylor v. Caldwell.9 4
Second, some maintain that it is an implied-in-law term. 95 Impliedin-law terms are terms that are provided based on a value external to the
contract, such as "community standards of fairness and policy."96 The
UCC and the Second Restatement, for example, reject the notion that the
impracticability doctrine is based on an implied-in-fact term, and take
the position that it is an implied-in-law term. 9 7 For example, the Second
Restatement's Introductory Note states that such cases are considered
ones in which there is a "'gap' in the contract."98
Scholars who believe that the law of impracticability is based on
implied-in-law terms usually offer one of two bases for the terms: (1)
89. See Ocean Air Tradeways, Inc. v. Arkay Realty Corp., 480 F.2d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir.
1973); Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Emps. & Helpers Union, 291 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1955).
90. E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. I1, introductory note.
92. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 297 (2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note ("The rationale behind the doctrines of impracticability
and frustration is sometimes said to be that there is an 'implied term' of the contract that such
extraordinary circumstances will not occur.").
93. SMITH, supra note 92, at 297.
94. See supraPart I.B.
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. I1, introductory note.
96. See id § 204 (noting that when supplying an omitted term, "the court should supply a
term which comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a
hypothetical model of the bargaining process").
97. See id ch. 11, introductory note ("The rationale behind the doctrines of impracticability
and frustration is sometimes said to be that there is an 'implied term' of the contract that such
extraordinary circumstances will not occur. This Restatement rejects this analysis .....
98. See id
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fairness; or (2) efficiency.9 9 A scholar offering the "fairness" rationale
"supposes that when courts set aside contracts [based on the
impracticability doctrine] the reason is that the contract is unfair." 00
Specifically, "that it would be unfair to hold persons to contractual
obligations that, through no fault of their own, are significantly more
onerous than they had anticipated."' 0 1 Williston, for example, felt the
doctrine was based on "justice." 02 The Second Restatement also takes
the position that the court must determine whether "justice" requires that
the non-performance be excused.103
With respect to the "efficiency" rationale, Richard Posner and
Andrew Rosenfield, in a famous article, asserted that in the absence of a
contrary agreement, the promisor's duty to perform should be discharged
when the promisee was "the superior risk bearer" with respect to the
unanticipated event.'" If the promisor was "the superior risk bearer,"
the promisor's non-performance should be a breach. 05 Posner and
Rosenfield stated that
[a] party can be a superior risk bearer for one of two reasons. First, he
may be in a better position to prevent the risk from materializing....
Discharge would be inefficient in any case where the promisor could
prevent the risk from materializing at a lower cost than the expected
cost of the risky event.106
Second, one of the parties might be "the superior insurer." 07 A
party is the superior risk insurer when it can better predict the probability
of the loss occurring and the magnitude of the loss, and when it can
better diversify away the risk. 08 This rationale is premised on the theory
that one of contract law's purposes "is to reduce the costs of contract
negotiation by supplying contract terms that the parties would probably
have adopted explicitly had they negotiated over them." 09
A third rationale for the impracticability doctrine is that the non-

99. See SMITH, supranote 92, at 283.
100. See id. at 287.
101. Id. at 288.
102. See WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 1931, at 5410.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272.
104. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
ContractLaw: An EconomicAnalysis, 6 J.LEGAL STUD. 83,90 (1977).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id. at 91.
109. Id. at 88.
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performing party did not agree to perform. As stated by one court,
[i]t is implicit in the doctrine of impossibility .. . that certain risks are
so unusual and have such severe consequences that they must have
been beyond the scope of the assignment of risks inherent in the
contract, that is, beyond the agreement made by the parties. To require
performance in that case would be to grant the promisee an advantage
for which he could not be said to have bargained in making the
contract. 110
As stated by Professor Charles Fried, "[w]here we really can be

confident that neither party intended to cover this particular case, and
where we can reach that conclusion without fearing a spreading
disintegration of confidence in contractual obligations generally, no
reason remains for enforcing this contract.""'
II. LABOR ACTIVITY AND THE LAW
In the early nineteenth century, labor activity, at least when
improper means were used, was sometimes prosecuted as a common-law
criminal conspiracy.1 2 Starting in 1842 with Chief Justice Shaw's
decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt,13 labor activity was generally no
longer treated as a criminal conspiracy.11 4 Instead, courts used their civil
injunction powers to prohibit labor activity. 11 Labor activity was
"treated as conspiracies which restrained trade and which inflicted
irreparable damage upon the affected employer."" 6
In 1932, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act," 7 which
prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes. In
1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act."' The Act's
purpose was to promote the recognition of unions by employers so as to
110. Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Mass. 1974).
111. FRIED, supranote 66, at 67.
112. ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 2 (2d ed. 2004); Walter Nelles, The FirstAmerican
Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165, 168 (1931); Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE
L.J. 825, 827 (1926). See generally Commonwealth v. Pullis (Phila. Mayor's Ct. 1806), reprinted
in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59 (John R. Commons et al.
eds., 1910).
113. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) I 11(1842).
114. STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 23 (2d ed. 2005).
115. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 112, at 2.
116. Id.
117. ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2006)).
118. ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
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reduce industrial strife that was burdening commerce, and to increase
employee bargaining power and thereby increase employee wages,
which in turn would increase employee purchasing power and avoid
recurrent business depressions.11 9 The Supreme Court has noted that "a
primary purpose of the [NLRA] was to redress the perceived imbalance
of economic power between labor and management."l2 0 Congress
"sought to accomplish that result by conferring certain affirmative rights
on employees and by placing certain enumerated restrictions on the
activities of employers."' 2' For example, under section 7 of the Act,
employees were given the right to form and join unions and to engage in
other concerted activity for the purposes of improving terms and
conditions of employment.122 Under section 8(a)(1), it was made an
"unfair labor practice" for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce" an employee in the exercise of his or her section 7 rights.123
Congress also made it an unfair labor practice for employers to
discriminate against employees for seeking to form or join a labor

union.124
An administrative agency-the NLRB-was established to oversee
elections to determine whether the employees desired to have a union as
their exclusive representative for purposes of bargaining with their
employer over terms and conditions of employment. 2 5 11Importantly,
Congress intended the NLRB to make labor relations policy.12 6
The Act also made it an unfair labor practice for either the union or
the employer to refuse to collectively bargain.12 7 To bargain collectively
was defined, under the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 (which amended the
NLRA), as "the mutual obligation of the employer [and the union] to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 28 It has been
stated that

119. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
120. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
121. Id.
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
123. Id § 158(a)(1).
124. Id. § 158(a)(3).
125. Id. § 159.
126. See generally Daniel P. O'Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The
NLRB and Methods ofStatutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 177, 184-86 (2008) (discussing the
NLRB's policymaking function).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3).
128. Id. § 158(d).
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[t]he purpose of the Act is to bring to the bargaining table parties
willing to present their proposals and articulate supporting reasons, to
listen to and weigh the proposals and reasons of the other party, and to
search for some common ground which can serve as the basis for a
written bilateral agreement. 29
Importantly, though, the duty to bargain in good faith "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."o30 Thus, whether there has been a violation is generally
based on a review of "all of the circumstances." 1 31 The issue is whether
the party is "seeking to frustrate agreement, or to disrupt negotiations, or
to oust the other party of 'partnership' in determining wages and
working conditions."l 3 2
But importantly, the Act "contemplated resort to economic
weapons should more peaceful measures not avail." 33 Thus, the Court
has held that an employer does not violate the Act by locking out
employees solely as a bargaining tactic. 134 Similarly, the Court has held
that section 7 protects an employee's right to strike.13 5
Although the Supreme Court has stated that "the Board construes
its functions too expansively when it claims general authority to define
national labor policy by balancing the competing interests of labor and
management," 3 6 the Court has interpreted sections 7 and 8(a)(1) to
ensure that neither unions nor employers have too great an advantage
during a strike through the use of various strike weapons.1 37 For
example, although an employer violates section 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) if it
terminates a striking employee who has not secured alternative
employment, an employer does not violate section 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) if
it refuses to reinstate a striking employee (in an economic strike) due to
a legitimate and substantial business reason.' 39 The most important
legitimate and substantial business reason justifying not reinstating a
striking employee is when the employer permanently replaces the

129. GORMAN & FINKrN, supra note 112, at 532.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
131. GORMAN & FINKIN, supranote 112, at 532.
132. Id.
133. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965).
134. Id. at 318.
135. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 15-17 (1962).
136. Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 380 U.S. at 316.
137. See, e.g., id at 318 (discussing the employer's power to lock out employees); Wash.
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 15-18 (discussing the employee's right to strike).
138. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967).
139. See id at 378.
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employee during an economic strike. 140 In such a situation, the striking
employee is replaced, but remains an employee entitled to reinstatement
when the position becomes available, as long as the employee has not
secured regular and substantially equivalent employment.14 1
The Court has also held that an employer cannot offer significant
inducements to striking employees and strike replacement workers to
abandon the strike and come to work. For example, in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp.,142 the Court held that an employer violated the Act when
it offered striking employees and strike replacement workers twentyyear seniority credit, when seniority dictated who would be laid off in
the event of a reduction in force. 143
The NLRB has also held that an employee engages in section 7
protected activity when he or she refuses to cross a picket line at another
company's premises (so-called "sympathy strikers").'" Accordingly,
the Board (with the approval of a majority of the courts of appeals) has
held that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) for terminating or
disciplining such an employee in the absence of a sufficient business
justification.145 Some courts of appeals, however, have been critical of
the Board's approach, which rarely finds a sufficient business
justification. 146
The NLRA does not include an explicit preemption provision, and
thus the task of determining its preemptive scope has been left to the
federal courts.14 7 The Supreme Court has held that the NLRA preempts
federal court and state regulation when the activity being regulated is
either protected or prohibited by the NLRA, or is arguably protected or
prohibited by the NLRA (so-called "Garmon preemption").1 48 The
140. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (dicta). For a useful
discussion of Mackay, see Julius G. Getman & Thomas C. Kohler, The Story of NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co.: The High Cost of Solidarity, in LABOR LAW STORIES 13 (Laura J. Cooper
& Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
141. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369-70 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.
1969).
142. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
143. See id. at 222-23, 236.
144. Torrington Constr. Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1540, 1541 (1978), overruled on other grounds by
Butterworth-Manning-Ashmore Mortuary, 270 N.L.R.B. 1014, 1015 (1984); see also GORMAN &
FINKIN, supra note 112, at 435 (referring to such employees as "sympathy strikers").
145. Torrington, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1541; see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 112, at 480
("The Labor Board and the courts of appeals are now in substantial agreement that an employee's
refusal to cross a picket line during the course of his or her work is statutorily protected.").
146. See, e.g., Bus. Servs. by Manpower, Inc. v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 442, 454 (2d Cir. 1986).
147. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008)
(noting that the NLRA "contains no express pre-emption provision").
148. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-46 (1959); see also
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primary purpose of this preemption rule is to protect the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB over unfair labor practice issues. 149 Also,
preemption exists when a federal court or a state regulates conduct that
Congress intended to be unregulated and left to the 'free play of
But
economic forces"' (so-called "Machinists preemption").150
activity
(1)
is
"a
merely
not
occur
where
the
regulated
preemption would
peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act"15' or (2)
"touche[s] interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [the Court]
could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to
act."S 2 In such cases, courts assume that Congress did not intend the
NLRA to preempt state law. 153 The Court has also held that although a
state law of general applicability (as opposed to one specifically targeted
at labor activity) can be preempted, "a congressional intent to deprive
the States of their power to enforce such general laws is more difficult to
infer than an intent to pre-empt laws directed specifically at concerted

activity."' 5 4
III. CASES INVOLVING LABOR ACTIVITY AND THE DOCTRINE
OF IMPOSSIBILITY OR IMPRACTICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE
Cases involving labor activity and the defense of impossibility or
impracticability of performance can be placed in four broad categories:
(1) cases in which the seller of goods or services fails to perform
because of a strike by its employees; (2) cases in which the seller of
goods or services fails to perform because of a strike at a third-party
supplier, which made it difficult for the seller to obtain the materials or
means to perform; (3) cases in which the seller of goods or services fails
to perform because of a picket line at the place of delivery, which is
honored by the seller or its employees; and (4) cases in which the buyer
frustrates the seller's ability to perform by refusing to cooperate with the
seller's performance because a union has threatened to go on strike
against the buyer. Representative case law involving each of these
Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2412 (referring to this type of preemption as "Garmon pre-emption").
149. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,
138-39 (1976) (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)); see also Brown,
128 S. Ct. at 2412 (referring to this type of preemption as "Machinists pre-emption").
151. Garmon,359 U.S. at 243.
152. Id. at 244.
153. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 509 (1983).
154. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 533 (1979) (plurality opinion).
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categories is discussed below.s15
A. Non-Performance Owing to Strike by Seller's Employees
A common scenario is one in which a seller of goods or services
alleges that its non-performance was due to a strike by its employees. 156
Not surprisingly, consistent with a strict view of the impossibility
doctrine, early cases often rejected a strike at the promisor's plant as a
defense to failure to perform. Thus, in the 1903 decision in Puget Sound
Iron & Steel Works v. Clemmons,15 7 the court rejected, with little
discussion, the defendant's argument that its failure to perform was due
to a "strike at its works."158 The court, in response to the argument,
simply stated that "[t]his was certainly a breach of the agreement." 59
Even for those courts that were inclined to address the issue at
greater length, a seller's argument that performance was simply more
difficult was predictably met with failure. For example, in the 1918
decision in Rudolph Saenger Co. v. Giant Silk Mfrs., Inc.,16 0 the
defendant argued that its failure to deliver promised goods was excused
under a contract provision stating that "seller shall not be held liable
because of late or non delivery due to strikes."' 6' The court rejected this
argument because the defendant's plant remained in constant operation
except for a ten-day period as a result of a strike, and the other
unspecified labor activity merely reduced production to a below normal
level.162 The court held that "[t]his situation did not justify an absolute
refusal to deliver at any time."l 63 The court also believed that it was
"significant that the market price for the goods had risen."1 6 4
Interestingly, courts during this period were more lenient when the
seller was only required to perform within a reasonable amount of time,
as opposed to a specified date. For example, in the 1906 decision of
Barnum v. Williams, 165 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a
155. For a list of additional cases, see WILLISTON & LORD, supranote 3, §77:92.
156. See The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some Selected Problems, 105 U.
PA. L. REv 836, 890 (1957) ("One of the most recurrent hazards interrupting a seller's ability to
perform his contractual obligations are strikes by his own employees . . .
157. 72 P. 465 (Wash. 1903).
158. Id. at 467.
159. Id.
160. 172 N.Y.S. 667 (App. Term 1918).
161. Id. at 668.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 102 N.Y.S. 874 (App. Div. 1906), af'd, 83 N.E. 1122 (N.Y. 1907).
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contract under which the plaintiff promised to perform work on the
defendant's construction project by a specified date.' 66 The plaintiff
failed to complete the work by the specified date due to the defendant's
fault.167 Thereafter, the parties continued with the contract, but the
plaintiff was further delayed when its employees went on strike. 68 The
court held that the plaintiffs failure to complete the work by the
promised date was excused because it was caused by the defendant's
conduct.' 6 9 At that point, the plaintiff, if the parties chose to continue
with the contract, was required to complete the work within a reasonable
amount of time.170 The court then held that when a party is required to
perform within a reasonable amount of time, such additional time "does
not include any period, long or short, during which he is unable to
proceed by reason of a strike."' 7 1 The court acknowledged that the result
would be different if the promisor were obligated to complete
performance within a specified amount of time.1 72 The Second Circuit
followed the approach of the Barnum court in The Richland Queen,' 73 in
which the court affirmed a trial court finding that a dock company's
delay in repairing a ship was reasonable because its employees went on
strike. 174
More recently, and after the NLRA's enactment, a supplier's
argument that a strike by its employees rendered performance
impossible or impracticable met with greater success. In the 1995
decision in Bristol Township School District v. Ryder Transportation
Services,175 the defendant transportation company entered into a contract
with the plaintiff school district, under which the transportation company
promised to provide school bus services to the school district for five
years.' 76 The contract included a force majeure clause that provided that
the transportation company "will incur no liability [to the school district
for the] failure to perform any obligation under this Agreement if
prevented by . . . labor disputes . . . or any other cause beyond

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id at 874-75.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
See id. at 875-76.
See id. at 877 (citation omitted).
Id
Id.
Richland S.S. Co. v. Buffalo Dry Dock Co., 254 F. 668, 670 (2d Cir. 1918).
See id. at 668-70.
No. Civ. A. 93-5983, 1995 WL 116673 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1995).
Id. at *1.
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[defendant's] control, whether existing or hereafter."' 77 Three months
after starting performance, the transportation company's drivers
unionized.178 About three months later, after the transportation company
and the union could not agree on the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, the union directed the drivers to strike. 17 9 The transportation
company allegedly offered drivers a two hundred dollar bonus if they
returned to work, but the union declined the offer and the strike
continued.180 Certain school district employees allegedly directed the
transportation company to not use replacement workers, and the
transportation company failed to provide the promised school bus
services.1 ' The school district then sued the transportation company for
breach of contract based on the company's failure to provide the bus

service.182
The transportation company moved for summary judgment, arguing
that its non-performance was excused under the contract's force majeure
clause, asserting that the strike was a "labor dispute" that "prevented" it
from performing its contract duties.18 3 In response, the school district
argued that the strike was not a labor dispute, maintaining that the term
was intended to refer only to a labor dispute involving a "third party"
and not a labor dispute between the school district and the transportation
company.184 The court rejected this argument, however, concluding that
the term "labor dispute" was unambiguous, and its clear meaning
included any labor dispute, not just a labor dispute involving a third
party. 85
The school district also argued that it was a disputed issue of fact
whether the transportation company's performance was "prevented" by
the strike. 18 6 The court noted that as a result of the strike, there were
only two ways the transportation company could have performed its
contract duties: (1) settle the strike by conceding to the union's salary
demands; or (2) hire replacement drivers.18

177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Ryder Student Transp. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 93-5983, 1994
WL 440236, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1994).
181. See id. at *4.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at *3.
185. See id.
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id. at *3.
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With respect to whether the transportation company could have
settled the strike by conceding to the union's salary demands, the court
held that because the company was free under the NLRA to take any
position it wished during negotiations with the union, as long as it acted
in good faith, the court would not permit "a jury to speculate about what
salary decisions [the defendant] should have made in its good faith
negotiations with the [union]."
With respect to hiring replacement workers, the transportation
company introduced evidence that the school district had directed it not
to hire replacement workers because of fear that striking employees
would "direct violence toward busses driven by replacements, thus
endangering the transported students," and because it was concerned that
the largely pro-union community would be angered by the use of
replacements.189 The court noted that if this evidence had been
undisputed, summary judgment in the transportation company's favor
would have been warranted.190 But the school district introduced
affidavits denying the allegations, and thus a genuine issue of material
fact was created. 19 1
Thereafter, the school district moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the transportation
company's non-performance was not excused under the contract's force
majeure clause.192 In support of its motion, the school district argued
that the transportation company could have settled the strike by agreeing
to the union's salary demands.19 3 In particular, the school district argued
that if the transportation company had given in to the union's salary
demands, its cost of performing the contract would have increased by
only eighteen percent. 194
The district court first held that the force majeure clause's use of
the word "prevented" indicated the parties did not intend to adopt
economic impracticability as the standard for excusing non-performance,
but instead intended a broader standard.' 95 The court then stated that the
decisions in Badhwar v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp.196 and Mishara
188. Id. at *4.
189. Id
190. Id. at *5.
191. Id
192. Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Ryder Transp. Servs., No. Civ. A. 93-5983, 1995 WL 116673,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1995).

193. See id. at *2.
194. Id.

195. See id. at *3.
196.

138 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), af'd, 245 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1957).
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Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp.'9 7 showed that
"[c]ourts have resisted a rigid application of the impracticability doctrine
to strike situations."' 98 The court also noted that the American Law
Institute, when drafting the Second Restatement, had deliberately
omitted illustration 7 of the First Restatement, which provided that a
strike excused a party's non-performance. 99 The court noted that "[t]he
drafters [of the Second Restatement] opined that the parties often
provided for this eventuality and, where they did not, it was particularly
difficult to suggest a proper result without a detailed statement of all the
circumstances." 2 00 The court then cryptically concluded that "Mishara
and Badhwar suggest that the court should enforce the contract's terms
by examining the circumstances presented by the strike, rather than by
resorting to traditional impracticability analysis." 201
The court also referenced its prior holding that the NLRA
prohibited the court from inquiring into the substance of the collective
bargaining negotiations "absent a showing that either party had been
found to have engaged in bad faith negotiations," and there was no such
showing here.202 The court then held that "[r]eading the force majeure
standard together with the limitations imposed by the NLRA, [the
transportation company] need only show that it made reasonable
attempts to negotiate with the [union] to effectuate the clause. Whether
[the transportation company] could, in fact, have met the [union's]
demand is immaterial to that determination."203 The court thus held that
"an economic hardship analysis is inapplicable to [the transportation
company's] assertion of the impracticability defense."20 4
With respect to the issue of hiring replacement workers, the court
rejected the school district's argument that the district employees who
allegedly told the transportation company to not hire replacement
workers could not bind the district.205 Also, there was an issue of fact as
to whether the transportation company could have safely continued to
provide bus services during the strike.206 The court then held that
although "[b]y law, [the transportation company] was required to take
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

310 N.E.2d 363 (Mass. 1974).
Bristol, 1995 WL 116673, at *3.
Id.
Id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
Id. at*4.
Id at *2.
Id at *4.
Id
Id at *5.
Id. at *6 n.10.
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reasonable steps to perform despite the strike," and although the
transportation company was legally entitled to hire replacement workers,
"[t]he practicability of hiring replacement drivers under the
circumstances is a fact issue for adjudication." 20 7 Accordingly, the court
208
denied the school district's motion for summary judgment.
B. Seller's Non-performance Owing to Third-PartyStrike
A second common scenario is when a seller who fails to perform
alleges that its non-performance was caused by a third-party strike that
rendered necessary goods or material unavailable. In general, courts
have not been receptive to such arguments.
In the 1906 decision of Samuel H. Cottrell & Son v. Smokeless Fuel
Co.,209 the buyer and seller entered into a contract under which the seller
210
promised to deliver coal from a particular supplier at a specified price.
The contract included a provision that stated "[d]eliveries of coal under
this contract are subject to strikes . . . beyond the control of the [seller]

which may delay or prevent shipment." 2 11 After the seller started
performing, a strike occurred at the supplier's coal mine.2 12 The supplier
continued to supply coal to the seller, but at a higher price because of
added supplier costs due to having to employ guards and take other
213
As a result, the seller refused to deliver
measures during the strike.
coal to the buyer at the contract price, and the buyer brought suit for
breach of contract.2 14
The trial court directed a verdict for the seller based on the view
that the strike authorized the seller to annul the contract, 215 and the buyer
appealed.216 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the doctrine of
impracticability only applies to "the act of God, the law, or the conduct
of the plaintiff." 2 17 In this respect, the court's decision was consistent
with a strict approach to impossibility that did not apply when the
impossibility was caused by a third party. With respect to the contract
207. Id.at *6.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
148 F. 594 (4th Cir. 1906).
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id.
See id at 595-96.
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id. at 598.
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provision providing for an excuse, the court stated that it did not apply
because the shipment of coal was not prevented or delayed by the
strike.21 8
In the 1919 decision of De GrassePaper Co. v. Northern New York
Coal Co.,219 the plaintiff paper manufacturer and the defendant jobber
entered into a contract under which the jobber promised to deliver coal
from a particular mine to the manufacturer. 2 20 The jobber did not have
any interest in the mine and did not control its output. 2 2' The contract
included a provision stating that
[t]his contract is made subject to strikes ... or other causes beyond the
control of either party. The buyer and seller recognizing the
uncertainty of absolute deliveries, it is hereby mutually acknowledged
that the intent of this agreement is not to hold either party for damages
accruing through failure to carry out the contract when such failure is
due to reasons beyond the control of the party in default, but that the
material shall be shipped by the seller and accepted by the buyer as per
deliveries specified, so far as the labor, the physical conditions existing
at the plants of the buyer and seller respectively, and the ability of the
transportation companies will permit.
For four months, there were labor troubles at the mine as well as a
shortage of cars, which reduced the amount of the mine's output. 22 3
Although the mine produced more than sufficient coal for the jobber to
comply with its contract with the paper manufacturer, the mine's selling
224
The jobber therefore failed
agents sold all of the coal to other parties.
to deliver a large portion of the coal.225 When the paper manufacturer
brought suit for breach of contract, the jobber asserted it was not liable
because of the contract's "strike clause."226
The court rejected this argument, however, finding that labor
troubles at the mine were a remote cause, and not the proximate cause,
of the jobber's breach.22 7 The court held that the jobber's failure to
secure a contract with the mine's selling agents for the coal needed by
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
179 N.Y.S. 788 (App. Div. 1919).
Id. at 788.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 790-91.
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the jobber to comply with its contract with the paper manufacturer was
22
the breach's proximate cause.228
Accordingly, "[s]ince the strikes and
car shortage were not the proximate cause of the breach, they were of no
avail to the [jobber], and it was not excused under the evidence by
reason of the strike clause." 2 29
In the 1953 decision of S.A. Ghuneim & Co. v. Southwestern
Shipping Corp.,230 the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract
under which the defendant promised to sell and deliver to the plaintiff
ten Ford trucks. 2 3 1 The contract was not for Ford trucks from any
specific dealer.2 32 When the defendant only delivered four trucks, the
plaintiff sued for breach of contract.233 The defendant argued that the
1952 steel strike, which made steel scarce, and the National Production
Authority's regulations requiring steel producers and distributors to fill
orders considered essential to national defense, made it impossible for it
to deliver the other six trucks.234
The court rejected the argument, finding that
neither the strike nor the regulations made the manufacture or sale of
Ford trucks illegal, and they did not cause to pass out of existence the
Ford trucks which . . . were on hand in Ford plants and in the sales

rooms of the thousands of Ford dealers throughout the country in
numbers far in excess of the 6 which defendant promised to and then
failed to deliver.233
Although the defendant apparently thought it would be able to
obtain the trucks from the particular dealer with whom it normally dealt,
the contract did not require trucks from any particular dealer, and thus
this was not a case involving the failure of a required article to continue
to exist.235 The court stated that
[t]he law undoubtedly has come a long way from Paradine v. Jane, but
I think it has not reached and should not be permitted to reach the point
where performance of an unqualified and unconditional promise to
deliver an insignificantly small number of an article ordinarily
manufactured and sold over the whole country by tens of thousands is
228. Id. at 790-91.
229. Id. at 791.

230. 124 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 305.
See id. at 306-07.
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306-07.
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excused by a strike of the workmen engaged in the production of a
product which is but a part, even though an essential part, of the
manufacture of such article. 236
The court also believed that because the practice of including
clauses in contracts excusing non-performance as a result of labor
activities or inability to obtain raw materials was so common, to excuse
non-performance in the absence of such a provision "would defeat the
fair and just expectations of the promisee."237
In the 1955 decision in Badhwar v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., a
seller and a buyer entered into a contract in August 1948, under which
the seller promised to deliver to the buyer (located in India) a specified
quantity of caustic soda, to be delivered in two parts. 238 The seller
promised that the first part would be shipped no later than September 22,
1948, and the second part no later than October 10, 1948.239 During this
time there was a threatened maritime strike.240 On June 14, 1948, federal
courts enjoined any strike for an eighty-day period to expire on
September 2, 1948.241 During this time, negotiations between the unions
and the maritime industry were taking place, and the maritime industry
was optimistic that their differences with the unions could be resolved
prior to September 2, 1948.242 Freight forwarders apparently shared this
optimism, and continued to do business as usual, and booked freight for
July, August, and September departures.243 The seller delivered the
goods to a third party who had promised to ship the goods to the buyer,
and the goods were loaded onto the ship from August 31, 1948 to
September 2, 1948.24 On September 3, 1948, the crew went on strike.245
The strike rendered it impossible to either sail the boat or remove the
goods.246
The court held that the seller was not liable for the late delivery
caused by the strike because, as construed by the court, the ownership of
the goods (and thus any risk of late delivery) passed to the buyer upon

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 307 (citation omitted).
Id.
138 F. Supp. 595, 599-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), af'd, 245 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1957).
Id. at 600.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 600-01.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 605.
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loading the goods on the third-party's ship.247 Accordingly, the seller
had fully performed its contract duties.
But, more importantly for present purposes, the court held that even
if the seller's promise had been to deliver the goods to their ultimate
destination by a particular time, the seller should be relieved of any
liability for loss occurring as a result of the strike.248 The court felt that
whether a strike will occur, and how long it would last, are too uncertain,
and "[i]n the face of the many contingencies to hamstring sellers and
shippers from proceeding to load and dispatch because of local and
national waterfront and shipping labor disturbances would virtually
stymie foreign commerce. ,,249
The court recognized that some contended that it is better to have
the seller bear the risk of loss as "one of the risks incident to his
business," but the court believed that "[s]uch reasoning is more
applicable to strikes affecting the seller's plant or place of business
which might be avoided by his own act, i.e., acquiescing in the
employees' demands." 2 50 But here, the seller had no control over the
striking employees. 2 5 1 And although "[a]t times it can be said that the
parties to a contract can allocate the risk of strike as between themselves
by making provision therefor in their contract," contracts are often made
in haste, as was the contract at issue. 252
The court stated that "[r]ather than mechanically apply any fixed
rule of law, where the parties themselves have not allocated
responsibility, justice is better served by appraising all of the
circumstances, the part the various parties played, and thereon
determining liability." 2 53 The court concluded that the seller "acted in
good faith and under the circumstances exercised reasonable business
prudence."254 The court also noted that the seller was faced with a
dilemma.255 If the seller had decided not to load the goods because of
the fear of a strike, it could face liability for delay if a strike did not
occur or occurred but was resolved quickly.256 The court concluded:

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See id. at 605-07.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id.
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For us to require sellers to know with foresight how long a strike will
last and to stop their commercial operations until the shipping picture
is completely clear is just too much tightrope walking to require of any
one. Where there is a strike, delay caused thereby, and loss caused by
the delay, the loss suffered by a party to a commercial contract is better
borne by him upon whom it falls, absent, of course, malfeasance by
any of the interested parties. 257

In the 1959 decision of Oliver-ElectricalManufacturingCo. v. 1.O.
Teigen Construction Co.,258 the defendant had a contract with a power

company to construct a transmission line. 2 59 The defendant and the
plaintiff entered into a contract under which the plaintiff promised to
manufacture certain hardware for use by the defendant on its project
with the power company. 260 One of the pieces of hardware was an item
made of steel.26 1 When the plaintiff brought suit to recover an unpaid
balance under the contract for goods sold and delivered, the defendant
counterclaimed for a delay in the promised goods being delivered.262 In
response to the defendant's counterclaim, the plaintiff argued that its
failure to comply with the promised delivery dates was excused under
the doctrine of impossibility because of a steel strike that delayed the
plaintiffs purchase of steel needed for the hardware.263 The court
rejected the defense, however, stating that "the impossibility must arise
from facts which the promisor has no reason to anticipate," and "[t]he
evidence clearly shows [the plaintiff] realized the contingency of a steel
strike at the time of entering into the contract." 264
In the 1960 decision of Butler v. Nepple, 65 the plaintiff, a lessee of
certain property, assigned his rights to the defendant in exchange for a
sum of money. 266 The assignment provided that if the defendants had
not begun drilling for oil and gas on the property by a certain date, the
defendant would pay the plaintiff a specified sum of money each month
as rent until drilling began or until the defendant reassigned its rights to
the plaintiff.2 67 The contract that was assigned included a force majeure

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
177 F. Supp. 572 (D. Minn. 1959).
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id.
Id.

263. Id. at 576.
264. Id.
265. 354 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1960).
266. Id. at 240.
267. Id. at 240-41.
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clause providing that the "obligations of the Lessee . . . shall be

suspended while the Lessee is prevented from complying therewith, in
whole or in part, by strikes, lockouts, actions of the elements . .. or other
matters or conditions beyond the control of the Lessee, whether similar
to the matters or conditions herein specifically enumerated or not."268
The defendant never drilled on the property, and did not reassign the
lease until more than eleven months later.26 9 The plaintiff then sued the
defendant for the delay rentals allegedly due under the contract. 2 70 The
defendant argued that its non-performance was excused under the
contract's force majeure clause because it was unable to obtain the
required equipment for drilling due to a steel strike. 2 7 1 The trial court
concluded that the steel strike did not excuse the defendant's nonperformance.2 72
On appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court,
concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find
that the defendant had not carried its burden of demonstrating that the
force majeure clause excused its non-performance.273 The court relied
on the defendant's testimony that the necessary equipment was
available, it was simply well over the usual price, though the defendant
did not testify by how much.274 Because the defendant had not
introduced any evidence of the price for steel at the time, the trial court
was justified in finding that the defendant had failed to carry its burden
of proving that there existed "extreme and unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury or loss involved." 2 75
In the 1977 decision of Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Construction
Corp.,276 the seller alleged that its non-delivery of promised goods was
due to "strikes."277 But the only testimony in support of the defense was
the following from the seller's marketing and sales agent as follows:
"[t]here has been some testimony having to do with strikes of various
factories. In my estimation the strikes caused a very small portion of the

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 244.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 245 (quoting Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Emps. & Helpers Union, 291 P.2d 17, 20

(Cal. 1955)).
276.

368 A.2d 1088 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).

277. Id.at 1091.
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problems that we encountered at that time."278 Not surprisingly, the
court concluded that there was "nothing in the record showing or tending
to show that strikes in any way provided an excuse for non-delivery."2 79
But when the contract includes a force majeure clause excusing
non-performance as a result of a strike, and the parties agree that
performance was rendered impossible by a third-party strike, nonperformance will be excused. 2 80 Thus, in Dant & Russell v. Grays
Harbor Exportation Co.,281 the court held that a seller's nonperformance was excused when the contract's force majeure clause
referred to strikes, and the parties agreed that a longshoremen strike
made delivery of the goods impossible.282 Also, in some cases it will be
a disputed issue of fact as to whether a strike by employees of the
manufacturer will excuse performance by the seller.283
C. Non-PerformanceOwing to Picket Line at Place ofDelivery
A third common scenario is where a seller of goods or services fails
to perform because either it or its employees refuse to cross a picket line
at the place of delivery. In Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Department of Public Service,284 the Washington Department of Public
Service suspended the permits under which some trucking companies
operated, after the trucking companies refused to provide services to a
hotel at which a picket line was established.285 The union representing
the drivers of the trucking companies told the companies that if they
permitted trucks to cross the picket line, or terminated any drivers for
refusing to do so, the union would call a strike of all the trucking
companies' employees represented by the union.286 The trucking
companies therefore refused to send any trucks through the picket line,
278. Id. at 1091-92.
279. Id. at 1092.
280. See Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Grays Harbor Exp. Co., 106 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1939)
(holding that the force majeure clause including a provision on strikes, lockouts, or labor disputes
exempted the seller from liability for non-delivery of materials caused by a longshoremen strike
throughout Pacific coast ports).
281. 106 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1939).
282. See id. at 912.
283. See Glassner v. Nw. Lustre Craft Co., 591 P.2d 419, 421 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
summary judgment was improper because it was a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the
defense of impracticability was established by the seller when there was a strike by the
manufacturer's employees).
284. 94 P.2d 484 (Wash. 1939).
285. Id. at 484-85.
286. Id. at 485.
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even though there was no violence or disturbance at the picket line.287
As a result, the hotel filed a complaint with the Washington Department
of Public Service, and the Department suspended the trucking
companies' permits under which they operated for thirty days. 2 88 The
trucking companies appealed, and the superior court affirmed the
Department's order.28 9 The trucking companies then appealed to the
Washington Supreme Court. 2 90
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Department's
order.29 1 The trucking companies argued that they were exempt from
crossing the picket line pursuant to the tariff under which they were
29
The tariff provided:
operating.292
Impractical Operation: Nothing in this tariff shall be construed as
making it binding on carriers to pick up and/or deliver freight at
locations from and to which it is impracticable to operate trucks on
account of conditions of highways, roads, streets or alleys, or because
of riots or strikes, or when loading or unloading facilities are
inadequate.293
The issue, therefore, was whether it was "impractical" for the
trucking companies to operate their trucks. 294 The court held that
"' [i]mpractical,' as used in this tariff, clearly refers to the conditions at
the picket line, and . . . the conditions there were not such as to make it

impractical for the trucks to pass through." 295 Also, the trucking
companies were not excused by operation of law because they were
common carriers, and it was thus their duty "to send their trucks through
the picket line." 296
In Luria Engineering Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,297 a
general contractor sued a subcontractor for breach of contract when the
subcontractor refused to perform, and the general contractor was
required to hire a third party to complete the work at an increased

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
213 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol28/iss1/3

34

O'Gorman: Solomon and Strikes: Labor Activity, the Contract Doctrine of Imp

2010]

SOLOMON AND STRIKES

81

price. 29 8 The subcontractor argued that it was excused from performing
because work on the project ceased as a result of a labor dispute, and
when work resumed the price of materials had increased. 299 The court
rejected the argument, however, finding that a labor dispute was
foreseeable because there were five contractors and subcontractors at the
site, and all but one employed union labor.300
In Unitec Corp. v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co.,301 the defendant
entered into a contract with the plaintiff, under which the plaintiff
promised to furnish and install, or erect scaffold for the defendant's
benefit at the worksite where the defendant was performing
subcontracting work.302 The plaintiffs performance of its contract
duties were interrupted, however, two days after it started work, when
the plaintiffs employees refused to cross a picket line at the work site
that was targeted against the defendant's non-union employees.303 The
defendant therefore performed a significant amount of the scaffolding
work the plaintiff was contractually obligated to perform. 30 The
plaintiff thereafter brought suit against the defendant for alleged
payments due for the scaffolding work it had completed, and the
defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract (for the scaffolding
work the plaintiff had not completed).30 5
The district court, after trial, entered judgment in the plaintiffs
favor. 306 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant that the
picket line was "not a circumstance of objective impossibility," though it
did not understand the plaintiff to be making this argument (the plaintiff
asserted there was a contract modification).307
In Mishara Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., the
plaintiff was the general contractor on a construction project and entered
into a contract with the defendant for the defendant to supply concrete
for the project.308 During the construction project, a picket line was
maintained on the site until the project's completion.3 09 During this

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 154-55.
358 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 473.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 474.
310 N.E.2d 363, 364 (Mass. 1974).
Id.
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time, the defendant refused to deliver concrete to the work site, despite
many requests by the plaintiff.3 10 The plaintiff then purchased the
concrete from other sources at a price higher than the contract price with
the defendant.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract and sought
damages for an amount equal to the additional cost of the concrete and
the expense of locating a different source.312 The defendant argued that
its non-performance was excused under the doctrine of impossibility of
performance, and thus there had been no breach.3 13 At trial, the plaintiff
requested jury instructions that essentially provided that a failure to
perform one's contract duties as a result of a particular event is not
314
excused unless the contract provides that such an event is an excuse.
The plaintiff also requested an instruction stating that the defendant "was
required to comply with the contract regardless of picket lines, strikes or
labor difficulties." 1 If these instructions had been given it would have
removed from the case the defendant's defense based on the doctrine of
impossibility. 16 The trial court refused to give these instructions to the
jury, the defendant took exception, and the jury returned a verdict in the
defendant's favor.
The plaintiff appealed from the adverse judgment, and argued that
the trial court erred in refusing to grant the requested instructions.3 18
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts first held that the trial
court did not err in refusing to give the jury instructions that in effect
provided that the doctrine of impossibility only applies when the
particular event is set forth in the contract as an excuse.3 19 The court
held that "[tlhis, in effect, requires a charge that no set of circumstances
will ever excuse a supplier from performing."320
With respect to the jury instruction stating that the defendant "was
required to comply with the contract regardless of picket lines, strikes or
labor difficulties," the issue revolved around whether such labor
activities could ever provide an excuse for the failure to perform a

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366.
See id. at 366 n.2.
Id. at 366.
See id.
Id. at 364.
See id.
See id. at 366 n.2.
Id.
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contract duty.321 The court noted that in some situations "[a] picket line
might constitute a mere inconvenience and hardly make performance
Also, in some situations, particularly those
'impracticable."' 322
involving industries "with a long record of labor difficulties," such
difficulties could be sufficiently anticipated at the time the contract was
entered into.323 But,
[m]uch must depend on the facts known to the parties at the time of
contracting with respect to the history of and prospects for labor
difficulties during the period of performance of the contract, as well as
the likely severity of the effect of such disputes on the ability to
perform.324

The court concluded that "[w]here the probability of a labor dispute
appears to be practically nil, and where the occurrence of such a dispute
provides unusual difficulty, the excuse of impracticability might well be
applicable." 32 5 Accordingly, the court held that the trial court did not err
in refusing to provide the jury instructions requested by the defendant,
3 26
and it was proper to admit the evidence of the strike.
In Monroe Piping & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Edward Joy Co.,327 the
defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff for breach of
contract.32 8 The plaintiff was a subcontractor on the defendant's
construction job, and had performed most but not all of its work. 329 The
plaintiff argued that its failure to perform all of the work was excused
because of a strike and picket line against the defendant at the
construction site by the steamfitters' union. 33 0 The defendant, however,
had established a reserve gate for the plaintiffs employees so they
would not have to cross the picket line.331 The court therefore held that
it was proper for the trial court to grant the defendant summary judgment
on its counterclaim because "[a]t best, plaintiff asserts that performance
of the subcontract was difficult because of the strike; however, it has not

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 366.
Id. at 367.
See id. at 367-68.
Id. at 368.
Id.
See id.
526 N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1988).
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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shown that performance was rendered impossible."33 2 One judge
dissented, without opinion, on the grounds that there was a triable issue
of fact on the impossibility defense.333
D. Buyer FrustratingSeller's Performance
A fourth common scenario is when labor activity at the job site
results in the defendant frustrating the seller's efforts to perform. In
these cases, the seller fails to perform, and then sues, alleging (in
essence) that its failure to perform should be excused because the
defendant breached the contract's implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing.334 This implied duty prohibits a party from "interfer[ing] with
or fail[ing] to cooperate in the other party's performance."335
In Moore v. Whitty, 336 the plaintiffs (partners) and the defendants
entered into two contracts under which the plaintiffs promised to install
tile, marble, and bathroom fixtures into two apartment building that were
being built by the defendants, and the defendants promised to pay the
plaintiffs for the work.337 Prior to entering into the contracts, when the
plaintiffs were asked to provide an estimate for the work, the plaintiffs
told the defendants they would only provide an estimate if they could
perform "under open shop principles."33 8 The union representing
workers at one of the apartment buildings had previously called a strike
when the defendants used non-union labor for other work. 339 The
plaintiffs, however, told the defendants that they had used non-union
workers on other jobs where there were also union workers without
trouble, and they believed they could do the same on this job.340 When it
came time to execute the contracts, the parties used a form contract that
provided that union labor would be used for the work.34 1 One of the
plaintiffs pointed out the union labor provision to the defendants, and the

332. Id.
333. Id. (Callahan, J., dissenting).
334. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.");
U.C.C. § 1-304 (2001 revisions) ("Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code
imposes] an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.").
335.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205

cmt. d (1981).

336. 149 A. 93 (Pa. 1930).
337. Id. at 93.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 94.
340. Id. at 93.
341. Id.
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clause was removed from both contracts.342 The defendants alleged that
they agreed to remove the clause in reliance on the plaintiffs'
representation about being able to work at a site with union workers.343
But when the plaintiffs sought to perform, union officials
representing workers at the job site told the defendants that if the
plaintiffs' non-union workers were permitted to start work the union
would call another strike. 3 " In response, the defendants refused to
permit the plaintiffs to perform under the contract, and had the work
performed by union workers.34 5
The plaintiffs then sued the defendants for breach of contract, and
sought damages.346 The defendants argued that the union's threat to
strike rendered performance of the contract, and defendants'
performance, impossible, thereby excusing their non-performance.3 47
The trial judge held that the defendants' evidence regarding the
threatened strike was insufficient to excuse the defendants' nonperformance, 34 8 and the trial resulted in verdicts in the plaintiffs'
favor.349
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 35 0 The court first noted
that because the union-worker clauses were stricken from the contract
the plaintiffs were free to use non-union labor on the job.3 5 The court
also held that the plaintiffs' alleged statements about being able to work
at a job site with union workers could not have been construed as a
guarantee that they assumed responsibility for the union's threat to
strike.352 And because the parties had discussed the possibility of labor
difficulties from the use of non-union workers, the defendants could not
rely on the doctrine of impossibility to excuse non-performance. 3 53 The
court also held that there was no showing that performance was
impossible, because it had not been shown that the work could not have
been completed without union workers, or that it would have been
impossible to complete the work with union workers and non-union

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id.
Id. at 93-94.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93-94.
See id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
See id. at 94.
See id.
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workers.354 Also, there was insufficient evidence of impossibility
because there was at most a threat to strike, and not an actual strike.355
In Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Employees & Helpers Union,356 a
dairy farmer and a creamery company entered into a contract for a term
of just over seven months under which the dairy farmer promised to
deliver milk to the creamery company, and the creamery company
promised to purchase it.357 A contract provision stated that
[i]n case of strike, lockout, or other labor trouble (whether the parties
hereto are directly or indirectly involved) .

.

. which shall render it

impossible for seller to deliver, or buyer to handle or dispose of such
milk, no liability for non-compliance with this agreement caused
thereby during the time of continuance thereof shall exist or arise with
respect to either party hereto. 358
The creamery company's employees, who were unionized by the
same union that had a dispute with the dairy farmer, refused to accept
the milk at the union's demand.359 A year before, the union had
threatened to strike if the creamery company handled "hot" milk.3 60 The
employees refused to accept the milk despite a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement between the union and the creamery
company that there would be no strike during the agreement's term, and
a provision stating that any dispute between them would be settled by a
negotiation procedure that culminated (if necessary) in arbitration.
The collective bargaining agreement also provided that the company
would not discriminate against any employees for "upholding the
principles of the [union]."362 The dairy farmer tried to sell his milk to
other buyers at the market rate but could not because it was considered
"hot."363 The dairy farmer ended up selling it to a buyer at a rate below
364
market price.
The dairy farmer then sued the creamery company for breach of
contract, and the creamery company argued that its non-performance
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.
See id.
291 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1955).
Id. at 19.
Id.
See id. at 19-20.

360. Id. at 21.
361.
362.
363.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.

364. Id.
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was excused under the contract provision regarding labor activity.
The trial court concluded that the creamery company's performance was
not rendered impossible,366 and the dairy farmer obtained a judgment of
$20,314.19 against the creamery company.36 7 The creamery company
appealed, and the intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the
creamery company's performance was excused under the contract
* 368
provision.
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the court held that the
contract provision regarding "impossibility" should be construed
consistent with the doctrine of impossibility, meaning the clause's
import was to permit the creamery company to avoid having to establish
that the labor activity was unanticipated. 3 69 The court then held that the
trial court was justified in finding that the creamery company's
performance was not rendered impossible.370
The court held that there was no evidence that the union would
actually call a strike if the creamery company accepted the milk, except
for the union's same threat a year earlier with respect to the handling of
"hot" milk.371 The court held that the trial court was not required to
draw the inference that the union would strike based solely on that
evidence. 3 72 Also, at no time did the creamery company tell the
employees they would be terminated for refusing to handle the milk, and
because the collective bargaining agreement included a no-strike clause,
the company could expect the union and the employees to comply with
Further, the company did not take any steps to settle
the agreement.
the controversy with the union, despite the fact that the collective
bargaining agreement included a dispute resolution procedure.374 The
court concluded that at most there was evidence as to what the
employees might do, and it was speculative as to what they would
actually do when confronted with potential discipline. 37 5 The trial court
could have justifiably concluded that the company did no more than

365.
366.
367.
368.
Ct. App.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 19.
See Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Emps. & Helpers Union, 278 P.2d 744, 748 (Cal. Dist.
1955).
See Oosten, 291 P.2d at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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show "a vague threat of adverse action by [the union] and the
employees, and that defendant was under no pressure other than its
desire not to antagonize [the union]."3 76 Further, the trial court was not
required to find that the "principles" of the union included a boycott, and
the company still could have used the dispute resolution procedure.377
Amici curiae argued that the union's activities were an illegal
boycott under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, that such
activities therefore could have been easily prevented by the company,
and that an illegal act by a third party should not form the basis for a
successful impossibility defense. 37 8 The court stated, however, that
"[t]here is nothing in the case to indicate that the national law is here
applicable. Hence there is no occasion to discuss the merits of this

contention."3 7 9
The three dissenting justices asserted that the employees had
refused to handle the milk despite a court order, the company's direct
order to handle the milk, and the threat of discharge.380 The justices
believed that the company should not risk sustaining other losses by
terminating the employees in addition to the losses it would suffer from
the employees' refusal to handle the dairy farmer's milk.38 ' They also
stated that it was unrealistic to construe the contract provision, which
was intended to protect a party from third-party labor disputes, as only
providing protection if the party showed its action was just, particularly
when the third party's legal rights in such a controversy might be
uncertain.382 They therefore concluded that the contract provision
excused the company's non-performance.
In Fritz-Rumer-Cooke Co. v. United States,3 84 the plaintiff entered
into a contract with the United States under which the plaintiff promised
to remove and load certain railroad tracks at a particular plant by a
specified date.385 The contract did not include a provision protecting the
plaintiff from any delay caused by a strike.3 86 One week after the
plaintiff started work, a strike of third-party employees took place at the

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id. (citation omitted).
See id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 24-25.
279 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1960).
Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
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plant and a picket line was established, which the plaintiffs employees
observed.387 As a result, the plaintiff completed the promised work after
the specified date. 8 Although the United States excused the untimely
completion of the work, the plaintiff sued the United States to recover
damages allegedly caused by its work being interrupted by the strike. 8 9
The plaintiff argued that in a construction contract the owner has an
implied duty to provide the contractor with access to the work site.390
However, the court rejected this argument, finding that the cause of the
work interruption was the plaintiffs employees' refusal to cross the
picket line, a matter over which the United States did not have control.39'
Also, the plaintiffs duty to continue working at the site would not be
discharged based on "unforeseen difficulties, however great," and would
only be discharged if "performance is rendered impossible by act of
God, the law, or the other party." 39 2 The court therefore concluded that
"the application of this rule required the contractor to complete his
undertaking without right of recovery for any damages that may have
been sustained."393
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OR
IMPRACTICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE IN CASES INVOLVING
LABOR ACTIVITY
As previously discussed, impossibility or impracticability of
performance cases involving labor activity fall into the following
categories: (1) cases in which the seller of goods or services fails to
perform because of a strike by its employees; (2) cases in which the
seller of goods or services fails to perform because of a strike at a thirdparty supplier, which made it difficult for the seller to obtain the
materials or means to perform; (3) cases in which the seller of goods or
services fails to perform because of a picket line at the place of delivery,
which is honored by the seller or its employees; and (4) cases in which
the buyer frustrates the seller's ability to perform by refusing to
cooperate with the buyer's performance because a union has threatened
to strike. Each of these issues is analyzed below, along with an

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Id. at 201.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 202.
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introductory discussion of the role of force majeure clauses in such
cases.
With respect to each discussion, an emphasis is provided on the role
of federal labor policy. As will be seen, instances arise in which factual
questions relevant to the doctrine of impossibility or impracticability of
performance implicate issues normally reserved for determination by the
NLRB. In such instances, it will be necessary to determine whether a
court should be precluded from resolving those questions.
A. The Role ofForce Majeure Clauses
An important issue in any of the above situations is the existence of
a force majeure clause in the contract. To the extent a force majeure
clause is included that refers to strikes or other labor activity as an
excuse for nonperformance, these clauses are usually drafted with little
attention to detail. For example, the parties usually fail to specify
whether the clause is intended to incorporate established impracticability
analysis (to the extent there is such a thing), or is intended to apply a
stricter standard that only excuses performance that is in fact impossible
(a Paradine standard). The parties also fail to clearly specify the
specific situations in which a strike or labor dispute will excuse
performance. Thus, although one might believe that a force majeure
clause referring to strikes or other labor disputes would make for any
easy case, it usually does not.
Of course, if the parties include such a clause, this will avoid the
non-performing party from having to demonstrate that the absence of
labor activity was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.
This is important because in many situations the possibility of labor
activity will be deemed sufficiently foreseeable such that the doctrine of
impracticability will not be available. Of course, as shown in S.A.
Ghuneim & Co. v. Southwestern Shipping Corp., the inclusion of a force
majeure clause that does not refer to strikes or other labor activity could
suggest that parties did not intend such activity to excuse non394
performance.
If the parties use a particular term to describe when labor activity
will excuse non-performance, and the term is broader than
"impracticability," the non-performing party might be more limited than
usual in demonstrating that non-performance is excused. Thus, in
Bristol Township School District v. Ryder Transportation Services, for
394. See 124 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1953).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol28/iss1/3

44

O'Gorman: Solomon and Strikes: Labor Activity, the Contract Doctrine of Imp

20 10]

SOLOMON AND STRIKES

91

example, the parties used the word "prevented," which the court found
was not synonymous with "impracticable." 395 Similarly, in Samuel H.
Cottrell & Son v. Smokeless Fuel Co., the court held that a seller's nonperformance was not excused under a contract provision when
performance became more expensive because the provision used the
term "prevent shipment."39 6 But this is not always the case. For
example, in Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Employees & Helpers Union,
the court held that the term "impossible" would be construed consistent
with the impossibility doctrine (which includes "impracticability"). 397
Otherwise, however, the issues involved in the use of a force
majeure clause when non-performance occurs because of labor activity
are generally no different from any other impracticability case. But
because provisions excusing non-performance as a result of a strike are
common,398 a failure to include such a provision can be used as evidence
that the parties did not intend such an event to be an excuse. 3 99 Also, as
the court noted in Mishara Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete
Corp., in some situations, particularly those involving industries "with a
long record of labor difficulties," such difficulties could be sufficiently
anticipated at the time the contract was entered into. 4 00 But this will not
always be the case, as shown by the decision in Badhwar v. Colorado
Fuel and Iron Corp., which noted that often contracts are drafted in
haste. 4 0 ' Thus, in that case the failure to include a force majeure clause
referring to strikes was not used as evidence that the parties did not
intend labor activities to excuse non-performance. 402
The issues involving the use of a force majeure clause do not
conflict with, and should not be influenced by, federal labor policy. Of
course, to the extent two parties foresee the possibility of a strike, and
agree that either party's performance will be excused as a result of that
activity, the contract can frustrate a union's efforts to inflict as much
economic harm on the target of the strike. But in such a situation, the
395. Civ. A. 93-5983, 1995 WL 116673, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1995) (explaining that there
are a multitude of non-economic activities that could have "prevented" or stopped contract
performance while the economic impracticability standard is narrower).
396. See 148 F. 594, 598 (4th Cir. 1906) (emphasis added).
397. 291 P.2d 17, 20 (Cal. 1955) (emphasis added).
398. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981) (noting that parties
often provide in their contracts for the eventuality of a strike).
399. See S. A. Ghuneim & Co. v. Sw. Shipping Corp., 124 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
400. See 210 N.E.2d 363, 367-68 (Mass. 1974).
401. See 138 F. Supp. 595, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), affd, 245 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1957).
402. See id. ("[W]here the parties themselves have not allocated responsibility [with a force
majeure clause], justice is better served by appraising all of the circumstances, the part the various
parties played, and thereon determining liability.").
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seller is already being harmed as a result of the clause. Because the
parties are taking into account the possibility of the seller's failure to
perform, the price for performance has already been reduced.
Prohibiting such clauses would simply result in an increase in the price
of the service or goods, with the economic harm to the seller occurring
during the strike.
B. Seller CannotPerform Because its Employees Go on Strike
Several issues specifically related to federal labor policy are
involved with the situation in which a seller cannot perform because its
employees go on strike. Each of these is discussed below.
1. Fault with Respect to Strike
With respect to a strike by the seller's employees, the strike must,
of course, not be the seller's fault.4 03 If it is, non-performance was the
seller's fault, and the strike would therefore not be an excuse.4 04
Determining whether a strike is the employer's fault is complicated by
two factors. First, fault is a concept that is not easy to apply. The
standard definition of fault is "[a]n error or defect of judgment or of
conduct; any deviation from prudence or duty resulting from inattention,
incapacity, perversity, bad faith or mismanagement." 40 5 Accordingly,
whether a strike was the employer's fault will be difficult to determine
even when the facts are undisputed.
Some cases, however, will be easy.
Thus, the defense of
impracticability would be unavailable if the strike was an unfair labor
practice strike (i.e., a strike in response to the employer's unfair labor
practices).406 In such a situation, the seller was at fault for the event that
made performance impracticable because the seller's breach of a legal
duty imposed by federal law was the cause of the strike.
But the issue will be more complicated when the strike is an
economic strike, caused by the employer and the union not reaching an
403. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981) (providing the defense of
impracticability only applying when the promisor's performance is made impracticable "without his
fault").
404. See id. (providing that the defense of impracticability only applies when promisor's
performance is made impracticable "without his fault").
405.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 683 (9th ed. 2009).

406. See, e.g., WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at § 1951A n.7 (providing that a
contractor was at fault when he failed to pay wages and there is a duty to do best efforts to yield
strikers, especially when the strike was the "consequence of his own wrong").
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agreement on the terms of a labor contract. In such a situation, the
employer did not breach any legal duty.407 Under federal labor law, an
employer is only required to bargain in good faith, and is not required to
agree to any particular union demands.40 8 Can an economic strike still
be the employer's fault in the sense used in the law of impracticability?
It seems unlikely.
If an employer has the right to engage in hard bargaining to try and
obtain a labor contract that is favorable to it, it would be strange to
consider the resulting strike the employer's fault. "Fault" suggests some
sort of unreasonable action, and the law traditionally has taken the
position that a party to contract negotiations is in the best position to
determine whether a contract is advantageous to it.4 0 9 Accordingly,
courts generally do not assess the adequacy of consideration. 4 10
Therefore, an economic strike cannot be considered an employer's
"fault," no matter how unreasonable it might be thought the employer
acted at the bargaining table. If the defendant proves that the union
struck for economic reasons, the defendant should be found to have
carried its burden of establishing that the event that allegedly caused
non-performance was not its fault. Note that this has nothing to do with
a concern that courts would become involved in matters of federal labor
policy. Rather, it is based on the notion that a party who refuses to enter
into a contract with another party because it does not find the proposed
terms favorable, cannot be considered to have acted unreasonably.4 11
But the fact that an unfair labor practice strike (as opposed to an
economic strike) is the employer's fault raises the issue of whether a
federal or state court in a breach-of-contract action is permitted to
determine whether a strike was in fact caused by an unfair labor practice.
In such a situation, the defendant, in an effort to establish each of the
elements of the impracticability defense, will seek to prove that it did not
commit an unfair labor practice, and in response, the plaintiff will
introduce evidence showing that the defendant did commit an unfair
407. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006) ("[B]ut such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.").
408. See id.
409. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c ("Valuation is left to private
action in part because the parties are thought to be better able than others to evaluate the
circumstances of particular transactions.").
410. See Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ohio 1991) (citing Judy v.
Louderman, 29 N.E. 181, 183 (Ohio 1891)).
411. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (providing that the defense of
impracticability applies when the promisor's performance is made impracticable "without his
fault").
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labor practice. And under the Garmon preemption rule, when an activity
that a federal court or a state seeks to regulate is arguably prohibited by
the NLRA, federal and states courts are usually required to defer to the
NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction.412 Thus, a federal or state court might be
precluded from resolving the issue.
As an initial matter, it is important to keep in mind that a
conclusion that a court is not permitted to inquire into whether the strike
was an unfair labor practice strike does not resolve what effect such a
conclusion has on the breach of contract case. Two different effects are
possible. First, if a court were prohibited from inquiring into whether
the defendant's failure to perform was caused by an employer unfair
labor practice, the defendant could be found unable to rely on the
The defendant has the burden of
defense of impracticability.
establishing each element of the defense, 4 13 and thus the defendant could
be held unable to prove that the event that caused non-performance was
not its fault. Second, the court could conclude that the "no fault"
element will be presumed to have been established by the defendant.
This issue need not be resolved, however, because a court should
not be precluded from inquiring into whether the strike was an unfair
labor practice strike. When a court rejects a defense of impracticability
because the defendant's unfair labor practice caused the strike, the court
is not seeking to regulate activities prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA.
Rather, the court is simply imposing liability against the defendant for
violating a duty imposed by state law (the duty to comply with contract
duties or pay a compensatory sum), and not permitting the defendant to
escape liability because it can also be found liable under federal labor
law for its conduct that rendered the impracticability defense
unavailable.
Also, deference to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB is
unnecessary "where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral
concern of the Labor Management Relations Act . . . [o]r where the

regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility."4 14 Providing compensation for the breach of a contract

412. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959) (citing
Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 489-491 (1953); Weber v. AnheuserBusch, 348 US 468, 479 (1955)).
413. See E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1975) ("The
burden of proving each element of claimed commercial impracticability is on the party claiming
excuse.") (citing Ocean Air Tradeways, Inc. v. Arkay Realty Corp., 480 F.2d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir.

1973)).
414. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44 (citation omitted).
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is certainly an interest "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility," and the state has an overriding interest in protecting its
residents from the breach of a contract.415 In fact, the enforcement of
contracts is considered to be one of the fundamental responsibilities of
the government,416 and the enforcement of contracts even when the
promisor had not acted at all (i.e., nonfeasance, not misfeasance) dates
back to the early sixteenth century.4 17 Of course, if the court were
inclined to reject the defense of impracticability in the event of
preemption, the interest at stake would be the defendant's interest in
avoiding liability when its non-performance would ordinarily be
excused. This interest, however, is also deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility. As previously discussed, the modem defense of
impracticability dates back to the nineteenth century. Accordingly, a
federal or state court should not be prohibited from deciding whether a
strike was an unfair labor practice strike or an economic strike for
purposes of determining whether the defense of impracticability applies.
Such a conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's decisions in
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Of America, Local 11 4418 and
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25.419 In these
cases, the Court held that a defamation claim and an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, respectively, were not
preempted. 4 20 The Court first relied on the fact that the tortious conduct
was not protected by the NLRA, and thus there was no risk that a court
would regulate conduct Congress intended to protect. 2 1 Second, the
state had an overriding interest in protecting its residents from the
alleged tortious conduct, and the state interest was "deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility." 22 Third, there was little chance of a
conflict with federal labor policy because the elements of the tort claims

415. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,498 (1983); Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
416. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, at IX (1974) (noting that the
functions of a minimal state would be "protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of
contracts, and so on").
417. See JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETr HARVEY, STANLEY D. HENDERSON &
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 193 (9th ed. 2008); see also Belknap, Inc.
v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 511 (1983) (holding that the state "surely has a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from misrepresentations that have caused them grievous harm").
418. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
419. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
420. See Farmer,430 U.S. at 305; Linn, 383 U.S. at 61.
421. See Farmer,430 U.S. at 302; Linn, 383 U.S. at 61 (citing Md. Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183
F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1950)).
422. See Farmer,430 U.S. at 302; Linn, 383 U.S. at 61-62.
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were different from the elements of an unfair labor practice.423 Fourth,
the NLRB lacked the authority to provide the plaintiff with the damages
or other relief sought under the state claim.424 Fifth, the court would be
unconcerned about the labor context of the case and would have power
to award relief only if the conduct was tortious (as opposed to a violation
of the NLRA), and the state claim could therefore be resolved without
addressing the unfair labor practice issue.425
A review of the factors relied on in Linn and Farmer shows that
more of the factors support the conclusion there should not be
preemption. First, a breach of contract is not protected by the NLRA.4 26
In fact, the Labor Management Relations Act promotes the
enforceability of promises, providing for a federal cause of action for the
breach of a collective bargaining agreement.427 Second, as previously
discussed, the state has an overriding interest in protecting its residents
from the breach of a contract. 428 Third, the NLRB does not have the
authority to award breach of contract damages. 4 29 Fourth, the court
would be primarily concerned with whether the defendant's conduct was
a breach of contract, and the unfair labor practice issue would only arise
as part of a defense to the claim. 430
Unlike Linn and Farmer, however, the court would be required to
determine if the defendant committed an unfair labor practice. Thus, the
breach of contract action could not "be adjudicated without regard to the
merits of the underlying labor controversy." 43 1 But this factor alone
should not result in preemption. The Supreme Court has noted that
"inflexible application of the doctrine is to be avoided, especially where
the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue
and the State's interest is one that does not threaten undue interference
with the federal regulatory scheme." 4 32 Also, in such cases, the
plaintiffs claim will not be premised on the defendant's unfair labor
Rather, the plaintiffs claim is premised on the defendant
practice.
423.
424.
425.
426.

See
See
See
See
427. See
428. See

Farmer, 430 U.S. at 304; Linn, 383 U.S. at 63.
Farmer, 430 U.S. at 304; Linn, 383 U.S. at 63.
Farmer, 430 U.S. at 304; Linn, 383 U.S. at 63-64.
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 512 (1983).
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006).
Belknap, 463 U.S. at 512.

429. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
430. See Belknap, 463 U.S. at 500-12.
431. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 300 (citing UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 649 (1958) (Warren, C.J.
dissenting)).
432. Id. at 302.
433. See, e.g., Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Ryder Student Transp. Servs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 935983, 1994 WL 440236, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1994).
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non-performance of its contract duty. 4 34 The unfair labor practice issue
only arises as part of a defense, and not as part of the plaintiff s claim. 4 35
Although the Court in Amalgamated Association of Street Employees v.
Lockridge4 36 held that a state breach of contract claim was preempted
when the claim was based on a union member's allegation that the union
has breached its constitution with its members,43 7 that case is
distinguishable. In Lockridge, the breach of contract claim was based on
a contract between a union and its members, and thus the potential
interference with labor policy was much greater.4 38 In a situation in
which the unfair labor practice issue only arises because the defendant
asserts a defense to the breach of contract claim, the state "regulation" of
the conduct prohibited by federal labor law is much weaker.439
Also, "[t]he primary jurisdiction rationale justifies pre-emption only
in situations in which an aggrieved party has a reasonable opportunity
either to invoke the Board's jurisdiction himself or else to induce his
adversary to do so."440 Although any person is permitted to file an
unfair labor practice charge," a party asserting a breach of contract
claim will usually not have a reasonable opportunity to invoke the
Board's jurisdiction. When the defendant breaches the contract, it might
not even be known that the defendant will rely on the doctrine of
impracticability as a defense. Also, it is unlikely that the plaintiff will
have sufficient information to reach a conclusion as to whether the strike
was due to an unfair labor practice by the defendant. Of course, if an
unfair labor practice complaint has been issued, the court should defer to
the Board's jurisdiction on the issue of whether the strike was an unfair
labor practice strike.4 2

434. Id.
435. Id. at *2, *4 (Defendant argued that its nonperformance was excused by a contract
provision which specified that it would not be liable for failure to perform if such performance was
"prevented" by labor disputes. Plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant engaged in
unfair labor practices to prevail on its breach of contract claim.).
436. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
437. See id. at 293.
438. See id. at 277.
439. See id. at 291-93.
440. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
201 (1978).
441. GORMAN & FtNKtN, supra note 112, at 10.
442. See Makro, Inc. (Loehmann's Plaza 1), 305 N.L.R.B. 663, 670 (1991) (finding that
preemption with respect to state action asserting trespass occurs when unfair labor practice
complaint is issued), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing,Makro, Inc. (Loehmann's Plaza II), 316
N.L.R.B. 109 (1995).
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2. Efforts to Settle the Strike
Another issue is whether the strike rendered performance
impracticable. An important issue in such cases will likely be whether
the seller could have settled the strike. As the Second Restatement
comment notes, "a party is expected to use reasonable efforts to
surmount obstacles to performance, and a performance is impracticable
only if it is so in spite of such efforts."" Also, the Second Restatement
comment provides that "[a] mere change in the degree of difficulty or
expense due to such causes as increased wages .

.

. unless well beyond

the normal range, does not amount to impracticability since it is this sort
of risk that a fixed-price contract is intended to cover."" 4 If the seller
could have settled the strike without "excessive cost," performance was
not impracticable, which in turn raises the issue of whether such an
inquiry is permissible. As previously discussed, under the NLRA an
employer is not required to concede to any union demand, and is simply
required to bargain in good faith."5
In Bristol Township School District v. Ryder Transportation
Services, as previously discussed, the court refused to permit a fact
finder to determine whether the transportation company could have
settled the strike and thus performed its contractual duty." 6 The court
concluded that any economic analysis was precluded." 7 Thus, whereas
in the past an argument that it would be expensive to perform would be
met with judicial hostility, in Bristol the transportation company's
argument that its refusal to concede to the union's wage demands was
treated as unassailable." 8 This approach was likely based both on the
increasing receptiveness to impracticability arguments (otherwise the
transportation company's position could have been rejected outright, and
thus still without any inquiry in the company's negotiations), and the
concerns regarding a conflict with federal labor policy. As noted by
Williston, "[t]he trouble with approaching the problem upon this basis
[whether the strike could have been settled] is that it places upon the
court the burden of determining the issues of the strike, a task now

443. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981).
444. Id.
445. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
446. See Bristol Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Ryder Student Transp. Servs., No. Civ. A. 93-5983, 1994
WL 440236, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1994).
447. See id.
448. See id.
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confined to administrative tribunals."" 9 Of course, the court could have
held that its refusal to inquire into the employer's ability to end the strike
meant that the defendant could not establish its impracticability defense,
but the court chose not to take that approach.
In cases such as Bristol, a court should be free to determine whether
the seller could have settled the strike at a price that would not render
performance unduly costly. Being required to pay employees a higher
wage is no different from the market price for needed materials rising.
The seller is not required under the NLRA to pay employees any
particular wage (any more than it is required to purchase necessary
materials), but a failure to do so when the labor or the goods can be
purchased at a price that is not excessive should not excuse nonperformance. Also, as previously noted, providing compensation for the
breach of a contract or avoiding liability when performance was
impracticable are interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility."4 10
An objection can be raised, however, that a court would be
prohibiting conduct that Congress intended to be unregulated. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a state cannot prohibit
economic weapons that Congress intended an employer or union to be
free to use against each other. 45 1 But a refusal to permit a defendant to
rely on the defense of impracticability when it could have resolved the
strike at a cost that would be insufficient to ordinarily establish the
defense, does not sufficiently penalize the defendant's refusal to concede
to the union's demands. For example, a contract duty is often
considered simply a promise to perform or to pay a compensatory sum to
the promisee.452 If that is so, a court is not punishing the defendant, but
simply requiring the promisor to perform one of its two options.
In fact, if a court refused to consider the matter, and still permitted
the defendant to proceed with its impracticability defense, it would harm
the effectiveness of the union's strike weapon. And this would be

449. WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 3, § 195 1A, at 5466 n.7.
450. See Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25, 430
U.S. 290, 296 (1977).
451. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 147,
149 (1976).
452. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462
(1897) ("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages
if you do not keep it-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory
sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event
comes to pass, and that is all the difference.").
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inconsistent with the NLRA's goal of raising employee wages.453 If a
court refused to consider the matter and then refused to permit the
defendant to proceed with its impracticability defense, it would reduce
the employer's bargaining power with the union. Although this
approach might be consistent with the NLRA's goal of raising employee
wages, it would still constitute taking a position that would have an
effect on labor relations.4 54
Accordingly, while at first glance a refusal to consider the matter
might be construed as the court removing itself from the labor issues
involved, such a decision will in fact result in the court strengthening
either the employer or the union with respect to their bargaining
positions. In fact, the neutral approach would be one in which the court
inquires into whether the strike could have been settled at a reasonable
price. If the court approaches the matter like any other case involving
the defense of impracticability, and treats the failure to purchase the
needed labor as no different from a failure to purchase needed materials,
neither union nor employer will be provided with a bargaining
advantage.
Also, as the Supreme Court stated in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,455
[i]t is one thing to hold that the federal law intended to leave the
employer and the union free to use their economic weapons against
one another, but is quite another to hold that either the employer or the
union is also free to injure innocent third parties without regard to the
normal rules of law governing those relationships. 456
In fact, the Court referred to such a scenario as a "lawless regime.A57
3. Use of Replacement Workers
Another important issue regarding whether performance was
impracticable is whether the seller could have employed replacement
workers to perform the work. Interestingly, and involving a recognition
of the unique aspects of a labor dispute, the court in Bristol held that it
was a disputed issue of fact as to whether the failure to use replacement
workers was reasonable based on a fear of picket line violence.458 This
453. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
454. See id
455. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).

456. Id. at 500.
457. Id.
458. See No. Civ. A. 93-5983, 1994 WL 440236, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1994).
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inquiry poses no conflict with federal labor policy. Although a party is
not required to hire replacement workers, there is no right under the
NLRA to refuse to hire replacement workers, and there is no duty to hire
replacement workers. Also, inquiring into whether the defendant could
have hired replacement workers does not penalize the defendant for
using an economic weapon, but perhaps only for not using the weapon.
4. Federal Labor Policy
A significant issue for purposes of this Article, however, is whether
federal labor policy should play a role in determining whether a seller's
non-performance should be excused. When a seller fails to perform a
contract duty a loss occurs, and the loss could be significant, particularly
if the buyer suffers consequential damages. The question is who should
bear the risk of that loss.
To the extent the buyer bears the risk of the loss, the seller's
financial harm will be limited to the lost profit from the sale, but it will
not be responsible for compensating the buyer for its damages. 45 9 Of
course, the seller will still suffer harm, because it will lose its potential
profit, and its reputation with the buyer (and other customers or
prospective customers) might be harmed, leading to reduced business in
the future. But if the seller bears the risk of the loss, the seller will be
required to compensate the buyer. 4 60 Accordingly, if courts routinely
hold that a seller's non-performance is not excused due to a strike by its
employees, a union's strike effort will tend to cause more economic
harm to the employer, and will thus be more likely to be successful.
The issue arises then, whether courts should take these effects into
account when deciding impracticability cases based on strikes by the
seller's employees. To the extent the doctrine of impossibility or
impracticability of performance is an implied-in-law term, and thus
imposing values external to the contract, a court could presumably look
to federal labor policy to assist in deciding these cases. The more
prudent approach, however, is for federal and state courts bit to take
federal labor policy into account. Courts are not well equipped to make
federal labor policy, and it was Congress's intent that the NLRB
formulate federal labor policy.461

459. See U.C.C. § 2-509(4) (2010) (implicitly stating that parties are always free to specify
which party allocates the risk of loss in the contract).
460. See id. § 2-713(1)(a).
461. See O'Gorman, supranote 126, at 184-86.
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C. Seller Cannot Perform its Duties Because of Strike by Third Party
Although the Restatement and the UCC anticipate situations in
which a "severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies" will excuse a
seller's non-performance,46 2 courts have been reluctant to recognize an
impracticability defense when the seller's non-performance is caused by
a third-party strike.463 As noted by the court in De GrassePaper Co. v.
Northern New York Coal Co., an inability to perform in such situations
might often be the result of a failure by the seller to enter into a contract
with a supplier to ensure receipt of the necessary goods or material
despite a shortage of supply. 4 64 Such a holding is consistent with the
efficiency theory of impracticability. The seller could have avoided the
loss at a cheaper cost than the buyer. The seller had the ability to enter
into a contract with the supplier to ensure the availability of the goods or
materials. Also, the seller is the cheaper insurer because it will usually
have greater access to information concerning the possibility of labor
disputes between its suppliers and employees.
Also, although the court in Samuel H. Cottrell & Son v. Smokeless
Fuel Co. focused on the court's force majeure clause, one senses a
reluctance to excuse non-performance simply because of a rise in the
price of necessary materials as a result of the strike.46 5 Such a holding is
consistent with the UCC's statement that "[n]either is a rise or a collapse
in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of
business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended
to cover."4 66 The Second Restatement comments similarly state that "[a]
mere change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as
increased . . . prices of raw materials . . . unless well beyond the normal

range, does not amount to impracticability since it is the sort of risk that
a fixed-price contract is intended to cover." 4 6 7
462. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1981) ("A severe shortage of
raw materials or of supplies due to war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major
sources of supply, or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or prevents
performance altogether may bring the case within the rule stated in this Section."); U.C.C. § 2-615
cmt. 4 ("[A] severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war,
embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which
either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies
necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section.").
463. See, e.g., De Grasse Paper Co. v. N. N.Y. Coal. Co., 179 N.Y.S. 788, 789-90 (App. Div.
1919).
464. See id. at 790.
465. 148 F. 594, 598 (4th Cir. 1906).
466. U.C.C. §2-615 cmt. 4.
467. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d.
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Further, because "a party is expected to use reasonable efforts to
surmount obstacles to performance,A 6 8 the seller is expected to look to
alternative suppliers. Accordingly, as demonstrated in S.A. Ghuneim &
Co. v. Southwestern Shipping Co., if the goods are available from other
suppliers, non-performance will not be excused.469
Accordingly, non-performance in such situations will likely be
limited to those in which the seller acted promptly after entering into the
contract with the buyer to secure a contract with the supplier. Also, even
if a court was inclined to excuse the seller even when the seller had not
secured such a contract, the labor activity would have to be
unanticipated (always a requirement), and the goods would have to be
either unavailable from any supplier or have reached an extremely high
pnce.
Because the labor activity at issue is that of a third party, no issues
of federal labor policy should arise. Accordingly, the NLRA will likely
not play a role in such cases.
D. Non-performance Owing to PicketLine at Place ofDelivery
A third common scenario in which a seller fails to perform because
of labor activity is when the seller, or its employees, refuses to cross a
picket line at the place of delivery. As the court in ConsolidatedFreight
Lines, Inc. v. Department of Public Service made clear, a fear of picket
line violence will be insufficient grounds for a buyer to refuse to have its
employees cross the picket line, in the absence of any evidence
supporting the fear.4 7 0 But as was seen over forty years later in Bristol
Township School Districtv. Ryder TransportationServices, with respect
to the fear of using replacement workers due to anticipated violence,
modern courts might be more receptive to such an argument. 4 7 1 The
court in Mishara Construction Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., by
affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that strikes or labor
difficulties never excuse performance, acknowledged that in some
situations a picket line at the place of delivery can be a basis for
472
excusing non-performance.
But as Monroe Piping & Sheet Metal,
Inc. v. EdwardJoy Co. shows, if the buyer establishes a reserve gate to
be used by non-employees, and the reserve gate cannot be picketed by
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

Id.
See 124 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306-07 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
See 94 P.2d 484, 485 (Wash. 1939).
See No. Civ. A. 93-5983, 1995 WL 116673, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1995).
310 N.E.2d 363, 367-68 (Mass. 1974).
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the union under the NLRA's prohibition on secondary activity,
performance is not impracticable because the reserve gate can be used.473
With respect to a situation in which non-performance is due to a
seller's employees' refusal to cross a picket line, the non-performance
must, of course, be impracticable. In this respect, whether the seller
could have compelled its employees to cross the picket line is relevant.
Relevant to this determination will be whether the employees' refusal to
cross the picket line is protected activity under the NLRA.
State and federal courts should be free to make this assessment. If
the employees' activity was not protected by the NLRA, the employer
should be required to threaten appropriate disciplinary action. Although
this will require a federal or state court to pass on whether employees'
conduct was protected by the NLRA, as previously discussed, providing
compensation for the breach of a contract is certainly an interest "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility."
Federal labor policy can play a role in such cases in another way. If
the seller's non-performance is excused, it will be less likely to take
action against its employees in an effort to compel the deliveries, and it
will not be required to pay any resulting damages to the buyer. If the
seller's non-performance is not excused, it will be likely to threaten the
employees with discipline, and will also be liable for any resulting
damage to the buyer.
Accordingly, excusing the seller's nonperformance will be beneficial to labor. It will encourage the honoring of
picket lines, and inflict financial harm on the buyer (the target of the
picket line) because it will not have any right to compensation for the
seller's non-performance. But, as previously discussed, because federal
courts and state courts are not well suited to determining or
implementing federal labor policy, such issues should not be addressed
by the courts.
E. Buyer FrustratingSeller's Performance
When a buyer refuses to permit the seller to perform promised work
on its premises, or refuses to accept goods, because of a union's threat to
strike, courts have been reluctant to permit this to excuse the buyer's
cooperation with the seller's performance. In these situations, the seller
could not act based on a simple threat to strike, particularly when the
collective bargaining agreement includes a no-strike clause. But a mere
picket line at the work site will not constitute the buyer frustrating the
473.

526 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (App. Div. 1988).
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seller's performance.
These cases could potentially involve important matters of federal
labor policy. To the extent a buyer is not excused as a result of a union
threat to strike, and instead must test the union's threat, this could lead to
the very industrial strife the NLRA was designed to prevent.
Accordingly, in such a situation, a court should be cautious in rejecting a
buyer's argument that it failed to cooperate with the plaintiffs
performance due to a threatened strike.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, as courts have become more receptive to the
defense of impossibility or impracticability of performance, they have
been more willing to find that strikes and other labor activity excuse
non-performance. At the same time, however, Congress has removed
the authority of federal and state courts to resolve labor law issues.
Thus, the potential for a clash between state contract law and federal
labor policy has arisen. In deciding these cases, courts should refrain
from reaching a decision that in any way seeks to develop labor policy, a
role reserved for the NLRB. But as demonstrated above, courts should
not hesitate to scrutinize a party's alleged excuse for non-performance
based on impracticability or impossibility simply because federal labor
law issues are involved.
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